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Abstract 
In this thesis, a model with a small monetary economy consisting of a 
homogeneous good industry and a differentiated good industry with monopolistic 
competition is presented. The economy engages in inter-industry trade, exporting the 
homogeneous good and importing differentiated products. Money is introduced into 
the model via the cash-in-advance constraint. Therefore, trade affects welfare, 
depending on the differentiated cash balances demanded. 
We find that trade improves welfare only under certain conditions. If the cash 
balance for the importable is smaller than that of the exportable, the optimal domestic 
production taxation is found to be negative. Free trade will then increase social welfare 
with taxation used optimally. If tariff is used together with the optimal production 
taxation, the optimal tariff is negative, no matter the number of imported differentiated 
products can be affected by the domestic economy or not. On the other hand, if the 
cash balance for the importable is greater than that of the exportable, the optimal 
production taxation is negative only under certain conditions, and it is possible to have 
it zero. With domestic taxation used optimally, free trade increases social welfare only 
under certain conditions. If the number of imported differentiated products cannot be 
affected by the domestic economy, the optimal tariff is positive with production 
taxation policy used optimally. If the number can be altered by the domestic economy, 
the optimal tariff can be positive or negative, depending on certain conditions. 
Moreover, with iso-elastic sub-utility functions, if the cash balance for the importable is 
greater than that of the exportable, the welfare improvement of trade will be greater 
with the optimal production taxation and the optimal tariff used only compared with 
i 
the consumption tax used in addition, and vice versa. Besides, in the case with tariff as 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
For a quite long period of time, international trade is studied under the 
framework of perfect competition. Theories on gains from trade, optimality of free 
trade and the welfare effects on policy interventions, etc., are developed. However, in 
reality, there are many products produced under increasing returns to scale with 
markets of monopolistic or oligopolistic competition. When we want to explain trade 
phenomena related to imperfect competition, those theories are inadequate or even 
inappropriate. For example, it is demonstrated empirically by Grubel and Lloyed 
(1971) that there is intra-industry trade between developed countries which have 
similar factor endowments and technological know-how. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
which explains inter-industry trade between countries with different relative factor 
endowments cannot explain this. Over the past two decades, economists have begun 
the study of trade within models of imperfect competition. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
study the welfare of closed economies with monopolistic competition. Based on the 
work ofSpence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the “love of variety" approach is 
developed. Krugman (1979, 1980, and 1981) extends this under the content of trade. 
In this approach, differentiated products in a group are treated as symmetric substitutes 
to each other with consumption of more varieties yielded higher utility to consumers. 
Lancaster (1979) presents the "ideal variety" approach emphasizing that each 
consumer has a preferred product specification and consumes the available product 
that comes closest to her ideal. 
One of the core theorems of trade is that free trade is the optimal policy for a 






1980). However, when we consider the context under imperfect competition, the 
above theorem may no longer hold even for a small economy. In such a circumstance, 
there may be beneficial policy interventions for a small economy. Venables (1982) 
shows that in an economy with monopolistic competition and inter-industry trade, if 
the number of differentiated commodities imported can be affected by the domestic 
economy, then the optimal tariff is negative. Flam and Helpman (1987) also suggest 
that a non-zero tariff is welfare-improving for a small economy engaging in intra-
industry trade of monopolistic goods. Gros (1987a，b) has the similar result. All of 
these suggest that it cannot be taken for granted that policies that are harmful for 
economies with competitive markets are also harmful under imperfect competition. 
Indeed, it is possible that some policies which hurt the welfare in models with 
traditional competitive market structure become beneficial with the presence of 
monopolistic competition. So, it is worth studying the welfare effects of policy 
interventions in competition other than the perfect one. In this thesis, a model of 
monopolistic competition is considered. 
When considering trade and trade policies, under whatever types of 
competition, most of the works in the literature are conducted within a barter-
exchange framework. It is possible that introducing money into models may alter the 
results obtained when there is no money. Magill and Quinzii (1989, 1992) have shown 
that in the case of the closed economy, money can have real effects in general-
equilibrium models with incomplete markets and with money introduced in the cash-in-
advance type. Kemp (1990) shows that free trade is not necessarily gainfijl for 
monetary economies with money-in-utility approach. Palivos and Yip (1997a) find that 
there exists an optimal tariff for a small open economy. 
2 
To introduce money into models, there are several ways that can be considered. 
One of the approaches is to put the end-of-period money holdings into the utility 
function. This is the "money-in-utility" approach. An alternative approach is to assume 
money as a factor of production. The third method is to introduce transaction costs of 
exchange which can be reduced by using money. Money can also be introduced into 
optimization problem involving use of overlapping generation models. Finally, money 
can be put into the model through a cash-in-advance constraint] In this thesis, money 
is introduced via the cash-in-advance constraint approach to capture the transaction 
role of money. 
The concept of introducing the transaction role of money underlies Tsiang's 
(1956) paper and is well developed in his later work (Tsiang, 1966), in which, in 
addition to the usual budget constraint, another constraint involving the medium of 
exchange is introduced. This way allows money to have a position in a general 
equilibrium model. This is called by Tsiang the "finance constraint". 
At the same time, the "cash-in-advance" is introduced in Clower's (1967) paper 
independently. This approach captures the exchange role of money. The way money 
used in transaction is modelled in a stylized fashion such that the moments agents sell 
goods for money and the moments they purchase goods using this money are 
separated. If money acquired by selling goods could be used instantly in buying goods, 
there would be no finite demand for the stock of money. In the setting, in order to 
make purchases, agents are forced to hold money balances since goods purchased 
during some time interval must be financed with money held at the beginning of that 
interval. It should be noted that Clower's cash-in-advance constraint is a static one, 
1 See Alan Stockman (1989). 
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while Tsiang's finance constraint is instead a dynamic one integrated with banks, 
money creation, borrowing and lending with the presence ofother assets. 
The cash-in-advance constraint is widely used in international macroeconomic 
models since it is convenient in providing a clear method that connects the use of 
money to expenditures and incomes. However, instead of concerning the real effects of 
trade, most of those papers examine nominal issues, such as the effects of trade and 
trade policies on domestic prices, the exchange rate and the balance of payments (see 
Batra and Ramachandran, 1980; Anderson and Takayama, 1978, 1981). 
One of the aims of this thesis is thus to clarify gains from trade for this small 
monetary economy with the transaction role of money emphasized and with the 
presence of a monopolistically competitive industry producing differentiated products. 
In the model, instead of having both pure cash goods as in Stockman's (1981) paper, 
or having some pure cash goods and some pure credit goods as in Lucas and Stokey 
(1987), the consumption of different goods requiring different cash balances per unit of 
value is allowed. Besides, the goods may range from pure cash goods to pure credit 
goods. Put it an another way, we have money entered the economy through a 
generalized cash-in-advance constraint. This can be explained as the outcome of 
existing regulations regarding the terms of payments of imports and the obtaining and 
use of credit to finance imports (see Laird and Yeates, 1990; Palivos and Yip, 1997a, 
b). Alternatively, the durability of different goods is not the same, and thus the degree 
of credit rationing. Basically, non-durable goods are subject to larger cash balances 
than durable goods. On the other hand, one can also consider that final products and 
intermediate goods require different cash balances with the former usually subject to a 
larger cash balance compared to the latter. This argument may be sound in the present 
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model since product differentiation may be more prevalent in the production of 
intermediate goods rather than final goods as suggested by Ethier (1979, 1982). Or 
being empirically supported, different sectors face different money demands and 
liquidity-sales ratios (see Cramer and Reekers, 1976; Palivos and Yip, 1997a. b). 
In general, we have different cash balances for different products, meaning that 
besides the distortion caused by monopolistic competition in the sector of 
differentiated products, there is the cash-in-advance distortion? The principle of 
optimal policy intervention suggests that in the presence of distortions, optimal 
intervention requires a tax or subsidy addressed directly to offset the source of the 
distortion (see Johnson, 1965; Bhagwati, 1971). Thus in this thesis, in order to deal 
with the distortion caused by imperfect competition, domestic production taxation is 
introduced. Due to the failure of that single policy instrument in bringing the economy 
to its first-best situation on one the hand, and the attempt to affect the number of 
imported differentiated products on the other hand, import tariff is used also. In 
addition, consumption tax is introduced aimed directly to mitigate the cash-in-advance 
distortion. This is another aim of the paper to see the policy implications in this small 
monetary economy with monopolistic competition. 
We have mentioned the importance of the study of trade under the presence of 
monopolistic competition. Indeed, there are papers concerning such issues, and the 
study of that kind becomes more and more prevalent. However, to my knowledge, 
there is no such literature on this field studied within a monetary economy. The thesis 
seeks to make a contribution in closing this gap by introducing money via the cash-in-
2 There will not be cash-in-advance distortion even with the presence of the cash-in-advance 
constraint if cash balance requirements are the same across sectors. 
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advance approach into a trade model with a small economy consisting an industry 
engaged in monopolistic competition. 
In this thesis, we construct our model based on the work ofVenables's (1982). 
We consider a small economy which is a price-taker in the world market. The economy 
consists of two sectors, with one producing homogeneous product under perfect 
competition and the other engaging in the production of differentiated products with 
increasing returns to scale under monopolistic competition. We assume that the 
comparative advantage of the economy is such that when the economy is open to 
trade, it exports the homogenous good and imports differentiated products in return. 
Thus, the economy is engaged in inter-industry trade. Therefore, trade affects welfare, 
depending on the differential cash balances demanded and the degree of competition in 
the product-differentiated sector. 
The remainder of the thesis is scheduled as follows. Chapter 2 gives the 
literature review. Chapter 3 sets out the model. Chapter 4 finds the optimal production 
taxation. Chapter 5 analyses the welfare effect of trade and the optimal tariffs for the 
import of differentiated products. In Chapter 6, consumption tax is introduced in 
addition to the other two policies. The welfare effect of trade with and without 
consumption tax under different values of cash balances of the importable and the 
exportable are compared. Lastly, concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 7. 
6 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This section consists of two parts: the first part rewiews policy interventions 
for economies with monopolistically competitive industries producing differentiated 
products, while the second part is related to policy interventions for a small monetary 
economy. 
2.1 Monopolistic Competition and Policy interventions 
Venables (1982) examines the welfare for a small economy with a 
monopolistically competitive industry. The economy imports products competing with 
this industry and exports a competitively produced homogeneous commodity in return, 
with no differentiated products exported. 
For the closed economy, production tax is used to correct the distortion caused 
by the imperfect competition of the industry of the differentiated products. Optimal 
taxation is found to be negative. However, decentralization of the optimum requires 
two policy instruments to ensure the optimal number of commodities produced 
domestically and the optimal quantity produced for each commodities. Using this 
policy to optimize the number of commodities still cannot take the domestic economy 
to the first-best optimum in general. 
When the economy is open to trade, an import tariff is introduced since there 
remain imperfections in the economy even though domestic production tax is used. 
Besides, if the number of imported commodities can be affected, non-zero tariff may 
improve welfare. The paper suggests that if the number of commodities imported 
cannot be affected by the domestic economy, then the optimal tariff is zero, given that 
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the domestic taxation is set optimally. On the other hand, if the number of commodities 
imported can be affected by the domestic economy, then the optimal tariff is negative 
under the optimal domestic tax. 
Venables (1982) also suggests that the equilibrium with trade has a higher level 
of social welfare than the equilibrium without trade under certain conditions. Besides, 
if taxation policy is used to optimize the number of domestic products produced, free 
trade increases social welfare. He also suggests the optimal tariff structure when 
domestic taxation has not been used optimally. In this case tariff is used as a second-
best policy instrument to control the domestic economy. He also gives the conditions 
under which import tariff should be greater than domestic taxation. 
Venables (1987) also develops a theory of trade in differentiated products 
allowing the possibility that firms have different market shares in different markets. He 
considers a two-economy-case with only one factor of production but two industries, 
one producing an identical composite commodity, and the other differentiated products 
under a monopolistically competitive industry. The qualitative behaviour of the model 
is broadly similar to the case of identical products and segmented markets. First of all, 
the welfare consequences are unambiguous that welfare in both countries is higher 
under free trade than under autarky. Consider technical changes then. A technical 
change which has no direct effect on profits does not change utility, the values of 
consumption or production of differentiated products, or the pattern of trade. 
However, technical progress, which has a positive direct effect on profits, in country 
l,s monopolistically competitive industry, raises welfare in country 1 and reduces 
welfare in country 2. Moreover, if the two economies are initially symmetric, then a 
small technical improvement in country l 's monopolistically competitive industry 
8 
causes this country to become a net exporter of differentiated products. Turn to 
> 
change in endowment. The paper suggests that endowment growth in country 1 
increases welfare ofit own but has no effect on welfare in country 2. If the endowment 
growth takes the form of population growth, it raises welfare per capita in country 1. 
Instead of productivity growth in all industries or population growth, consider, for 
country 1, there is a change which increases the efficiency of the endowment in the 
production of the numeraire, but not in the production of differentiated products. The 
change raises welfare in country 2 while its effect on country 1 is ambiguous. When 
considering policy implication, the paper establishes a strong case for active 
government intervention through trade and industrial policy. It suggests that country 
l ' s welfare can be raised by an increase in its import tariff, even if tariff revenue is of 
zero social value. Besides, a country may increases its welfare by a small subsidy to the 
fixed costs, marginal costs, or export costs of its domestic firms. These policies work 
either by damaging foreign firms, or by aiding domestic firms. 
Gros (1987b) also finds the optimal tariff. In his paper, Gros uses Krugman's 
(1980) model of trade under monopolistic competition with product differentiation to 
find the optimal tariff and to examine the welfare effects of the optimal tariff without 
retaliation and the equilibrium tariff with retaliation. With intra-industry trade, even for 
a small country, there exists an optimal tariff. The optimal tariff in this case can be 
thought of as an export tariff. By forcing producers to price discriminate between 
foreign and domestic sales, producers exercise their monopoly power abroad and that 
benefits the home country. In the case without retaliation, the optimal tariff should be 
an increasing fiinction of the size of the home country and also the degree of product 
differentiation. When retaliation is introduced, the commercial policy becomes a two-
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player game. The home country will take any foreign tariff into account when choosing 
its own optimal tariff rate. A Nash equilibrium is obtained when no country has an 
incentive to ftirther adjust its own tariff rate. The equilibrium tariff rate for the home 
country in this case is an increasing function of the size of the home country. This tariff 
rate is lower than the rate the home country would impose in the absence of retaliation. 
The welfare consequences of a tariff war are studied in addition. The results suggest 
that only a country that is almost three times as big as the rest of the world can gain 
from a tarifF war. Besides, at least for countries that are not as big as the rest of the 
world, the potential loss from a tariff war is large. In the case of a trade war between 
two countries of equal size, there will be a welfare loss equivalent to a drop in income 
of about 4 percent compared to the welfare level under free trade. 
Lancaster (1984) pays more attention on product differentiation and product 
variety. His paper examines the relationship among protection, product differentiation, 
and product variety. In particular, it tries to explore the effects of tariffs or other 
protective measures on the degree of product differentiation or variety. 
The model considered is the one with a monopolistically competitive industry. 
In the model there are two sectors, one producing a single homogeneous numeraire 
good under constant returns to scale while the other differentiated products each of 
which is produced under some kind of economies of scale. The product-differentiated 
sector is modelled in the neo-Hotelling tradition. 
It is found that, although trade increases the degree of product variety, trade 
restrictions do not necessarily reduce it. Indeed, the paper suggests that in both of the 
large-country case with symmetric trade between two identical countries and the small-
country case without reaction of the rest of the world, the degree ofproduct variety is 
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increased as a result ofthe imposition of tariffs. It is because with intra-industry trade 
in monopolistic competition, imports are close but not perfect substitute for home 
goods. Tariffs raise the monopoly power and thus the profits of the local firms, 
inducing entry with more firms and more products resulted. It also suggests that a 
small country which imports goods in the same product differentiated group as it 
makes locally can gain by imposing a tariff when there are imports which are relatively 
close substitutes for local goods. 
Lin (1996a) also examines the welfare effects of tariffs. He focuses on the 
importance of patterns of demand linkages among several goods from monopolistically 
competitive sectors in examining the welfare effects of tariff protection. Under a 
general equilibrium framework, the economy considered is a small open one endowed 
with many productive factors which are mobile across sectors but not internationally. 
There are three sectors in the economy, with one competitive sector producing the 
numeraire homogeneous good and two noncompetitive sectors producing two classes 
of differentiated goods respectively under monopolistic competition. Each imported 
good is a substitute for goods from a noncompetitive sector and a complement to 
goods from another noncompetitive sector. On the other hand, the domestic demand 
linkage between these two classes of domestically produced goods is insignificant such 
that one can focus on the linkage between goods produced at home and abroad. 
In this setting, tariffs are likely to work against the import-complementing 
sector via demand interdependence, thus aggravating distortions and reducing national 
welfare. Two types of tariff protections are considered: "targeted tariff protection" 
with protection of a targeted noncompetitive sector, and “across-the-board tariff 
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protection" with protection ofboth noncompetitive sectors by imposing different tariff 
rates. 
Consider the case with symmetric noncompetitive sectors. In this case firms are 
symmetric globally. With identical noncompetitive sectors, all goods are substitutes. In 
this case the model collapses into Flam and Helpman's (1987) two-sector model. It is 
found that tariff protection, either targeted or across-the-board, raises domestic 
welfare. 
Another case, the Ricardian case with free entry, is considered. In this case, 
there is one single factor of production. The result is that if the imported and the 
domestically produced differentiated goods in these two noncompetitive sectors are all 
substitutes, both types of tariff protections remain welfare-enhancing. However, with 
complementary goods in existence, these protections may become a welfare-reducing 
policy if they harm the import-complementing sector more than they assist the import-
substituting sector. If these goods are all complements to one another, either type of 
protections is welfare-reducing. 
The last case considered is the Ricardian case with no entry. It can be shown 
that any given structure of demand interdependence plays the same role both in the 
free-entry and no-entry regime. The preceding analysis of the free-entry regime 
remains applicable to this no-entry regime. 
In addition, to ensure welfare enhancement, this paper also suggests the 
necessity of assessing the size and the domestic absorption share of the import-
complementing sector relative to the import-substituting sector. If the two structural 
indicators are sufficiently significant, tariff policy tends to reduce welfare and vice 
versa. Finally, the paper suggests that it is much harder for a small open economy to 
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enforce the across-the-board protection than the targeted tariff protection, since the 
former requires much more informational details of both demand interdependence 
among noncompetitive markets and economic structure. 
In another paper of Gros (1987a), the welfare effects of other trade policies, 
instead of tariff only, are also studied. In the paper, Gros provides an analysis of the 
effects of commercial policy in a model of trade with product differentiation and 
monopolistic competition that can be applied to trade among industrialized countries 
with intra-industry trade. This paper consider a generalized one-sector version of 
Krugman's (1980) model in which there is only one industry producing a differentiated 
good with increasing returns to scale. Under this framework, Gros shows that export 
taxes and import tariffs are equivalent except that the terms of trade are different in 
these two cases. Besides, the paper shows that quota or voluntary export restraints 
(VERs) are also equivalent to tariffs if the market for import licenses is competitive. 
However, if the distribution of imports in the home country is no longer a competitive 
business, with the government selling import licenses only to firms that produce the 
specific product to be imported, or if each specification could be imported by only one 
middleman, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas does not hold any more. The tariff 
rates that are equivalent to quotas are found for the case with the equivalence 
proposition held. 
The welfare effects of trade policies are studied also. Consider the case of an 
import tariff. Since it does not affect the elasticity of demand, the equilibrium output 
per firm and the equilibrium number of products or firms are not affected by the 
imposition oftarifF. The tariff only shifts the composition of consumption toward home 
goods. However, under the setting of the model, it does not seem possible to derive a 
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closed-form solution for the gain in welfare in terms of the parameters. Moreover, 
when there is a tariff war, only a country that is larger than the foreign country has an 
interest to impose a positive tariff. If a country is smaller than its follower, the optimal 
policy is to impose a negative tariff given that retaliation is possible. (See Gros, 1987b) 
For the case of quota, it is shown that although a large country might gain from 
the imposition of a quota, a small country is likely to lose from such a policy. It is 
because a large country has market power on the world market. It can turn the terms 
of trade to its favour and outweigh the loss from distortions created by the quota. 
However, a small country does not have such market power. 
For voluntary export restraints, it can never benefit the consumer in the home 
country. The welfare losses from such agreements can be considerable, even for 
consumers in a large country. 
Another type of commercial policy, export subsidies, which is equivalent to 
import subsidies, always leads to a welfare loss for the home country in the absence of 
retaliation. 
Flam and Helpman (1987) also study the welfare effects of various trade 
policies. In the paper, they study general equilibrium effects of tariffs, export subsidies, 
output subsidies and R&D subsidies in a monopolistically competitive sector that 
produces differentiated products. The model consists of a small country producing a 
homogeneous product and differentiated products with R&D, and engaging in intra-
industry trade of the differentiated products. The existence of R&D costs results in 
increasing returns to scale in the industry with differentiated products. Under a 
reasonably general production structure, they study the welfare effects of several 
policy instruments widely used in many countries, namely, tariffs, exports subsidies, 
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output subsidies and R&D subsidies. Instead of finding a policy that works in a 
particular setup, they focus on whether the particular policy is beneficial in all or most 
relevant environments. 
They find that a small tariff is welfare-improving. However, the welfare effects 
of the other three instruments are ambiguous. In each of these cases, the policy raises 
welfare only under certain conditions, and there exist circumstances that it reduces 
welfare on the other hand. When compare to others' findings in the literature, they 
conclude that a more general economic structure, which includes inter-sectoral 
interactions and opportunities of entry and exit in the differentiated products industry, 
weakens the case for policy intervention. They also presume that under a more general 
structure with more than one non-competitive sector, there would be even more 
doubtful about the prospect of beneficial industrial policy. Another conclusion is that 
even though there potentially exists a case for industrial policy, the welfare 
consequences depend on details of production structure, the nature of competition, the 
sectoral interlinkages through factor markets and the structure of preferences. Policy 
recommendations in practical application are difficult to make as detailed information 
is needed on the one hand, and the reaction of trading partners such as retaliation 
should be taken into account on the other hand. 
In another paper of Lin (1996b), the focus is on export subsidies. This paper 
identifies the role of bilateral export subsidies coordinated in a cooperative manner in 
counteracting consumption distortions under monopolistic competition. The paper 
builds on a general equilibrium framework where two large economies trade for 
differentiated products. The model considered is a two-country, two-sector and multi-
factor one. The Home and Foreign countries are symmetric in preferences, 
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technologies and factor endowments. Each country produces a homogeneous good 
and many types of differentiated products. 
It can be shown that in the context of intra-industry trade in differentiated 
products, small export subsidies can enhance world welfare, regardless of how the 
trading partners coordinate their subsidy rates. 
When examining how the world welfare effect is distributed between Home and 
Foreign, the followings should be taken into consideration: the coordinated ratio of 
Foreign to Home subsidies, and the characteristics of industrial organization and 
economic structure such as the degree of monopoly power, the share of spending in 
differentiated products and the substitutability between production activities. 
Three regimes are considered. The first regime studied is the case under one of 
the following circumstances: the differentiated products reduced to a homogeneous 
good, resources become immobile across sectors, or 100 per cent share of spending in 
the differentiated products. Under any one of these circumstances, there exists almost 
no room in which countries can gain altogether by coordinating their export subsidy 
rates and a country with a higher (lower) subsidy rate must be worse (better) off. 
Another regime is that, if the degree of monopoly power is sufficiently 
significant, any coordinated export subsidies benefit each country, although the 
resulting world welfare gains are biased towards the country introducing a smaller 
subsidy rate. 
The third regime represents a middle case between 1 and 2. This regime does 
not guarantee that export subsidies must be both nationally and globally welfare-
improving. The actual scenario depends on whether the coordinated ratio ofForeign to 
Home subsidies falls into a structurally-determined range. 
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2.2 Policv Interventions in Monetary Economies 
Palivos and Yip (1997a) attempt to re-examine the welfare effects of import 
quotas for a small monetary economy. A two-sector trade model in which money 
enters the economy through a generalized cash-in-advance constraint is developed. In 
the model, the share of purchases which must be made using cash varies across 
markets. If the cash balance for the importable is greater than that of the exportable, 
then the traditional negative effect of an import quota on welfare is strengthened. If the 
initial situation is free trade, then a zero quota remains the optimal policy. If an 
effective import quota already exists, then eliminating the import quota is welfare-
enhancing. On the other hand, if the consumption of exportable requires larger cash 
balance than the consumption of importable, then an import quota may promote 
national welfare. In this case, an optimal quota level exists. 
To examine the possibility of immiserizing growth, the authors extend the 
. ！ 
framework to allow for technical progress. Technical progress takes place in the ！ 
industry of the importable only, with no progress in another sector. They find that, for 
a small monetary economy with import quotas, growth induced by Hicks-neutral 
technical progress is welfare-enhancing if the degree of monetization in the growing 
sector is higher than the one in the static sector, that is, if the consumption of the 
goods produced in the growing sector requires larger cash balance. If the static sector 
displays a higher degree of monetization, then growth can be immiserizing. 
In their later work, Palivos and Yip (1997b) also study the gains from trade for 
a small economy within a dynamic generalized cash-in-advance model. Money is 
introduced and the transaction role of it is emphasized. The real effects of trade are 
examined. 
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In the model, a small open economy with a CIA constraint is considered. It is 
suggested that in general the cash balances for the exportable and the importable are 
different. If they are the same, we have the standard result that free trade maximizes 
welfare. But ifit is not the case, free trade is no longer the first-best policy in the small 
monetary economy. The economy is worse off after trade if the consumption of 
exportable requires larger cash balances than the consumption of importable. On the 
other hand, if the cash balance for the importable is greater than that of the exportable, 
free trade is preferred to autarky. However, policy intervention can further improve the 
welfare of the economy, regardless of whether free trade is gainful or harmful 
compared with autarky. Three types of policy intervention are considered: the optimal 
quantity of money rule, also known as the Friedman rule, a tariff and a consumption 
tax. It is found that the Friedman rule removes the monetary distortion that gives rise 
to harmful trade. Under the optimal quantity of money rule, free trade is the optimal 
trade policy even within a monetary environment. Alternatively, the CIA constraint can 
be offset by a tariff and thus the optimal tariff is non-zero. The optimal tariff is positive 
if the cash balance for the exportable is greater than that of the importable. Under the 
optimal consumption tax, the optimality condition is restored. Note that a consumption 
tax is Pareto superior to a tariff since the CIA constraint introduces a demand-side 
distortion that should be corrected by a consumption tax. However, a tariff affects 
both of the consumption side and the production side of the economy. Besides, a 
calibration is exercised. It suggests that the optimal value for a consumption tax or for 
a tariff is in general small. 
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Chapter 3. The Model 
3.1 Commodities 
In this section, we construct the basic model on which our later analysis is 
based. Consider a closed economy first. There are two sectors in the economy. One of 
them is a monopolistically competitive industry which produces commodities from a 
set，S, ofdifFerentiated commodities. The commodities in the set*S'will be labelled i =1， 
2，…，�,".; X, is defined as the quantity of the zth product while Pi is the price ofit. One 
type of commodity is produced by a single firm since the production of each of these 
commodities exhibits increasing returns to scale. For each product to be produced, a 
fixed cost, Fi, is incurred. Thus, the production cost of a single product incurs a fixed 
cost, Fi, which is independent of the scale of output, and an operation cost, c,(x/): 
C(x,) = c,.(x,) + i^ � 
where C{xi) is the production cost of the zth product. 
For the operation costs, c,(x,), we have C/(x,) > 0 for the products to be 
produced, and c"(X/) > 0. Since a fixed cost is incurred for each product to be 
produced, only some of the potentially available commodities from S will be produced 
in general. In equilibrium, the first n commodities will be produced, where n is an 
endogenous variable. For the n commodities to be produced, the arrangement is that jc,-
> 0 for i = 1, ..., n, and x,. = 0 for i > n + 1. 
Another sector, labelled 0，is a homogeneous good with Xo as its aggregate 
consumption and po the price of it. For an individual firm, X^ is the quantity produced. 
The production incurs the operation cost, Co(Xo), only, and we have Co(Xo) > 0 and 
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Co\Xo) > 0 for Xo > 0. The supply of the homogeneous commodity is perfectly 
competitive. 
The economy has endowment Z in terms of the homogeneous good, and the 
consumption of that good can be expressed as: 
PoX,-PoZ-f^{c , (x , ) + F,). (2) 
Z=1 
In the closed economy, poXo is equal to co(jCo) which is the total cost of the 
homogeneous good since the market is competitive. 
Besides, M is the stock of the money supply for the economy while M is the 
nominal money holdings. 
3.2 Demands 
We have an individualistic social welfare function from which demands are 
derived. The social welfare function is defined on the aggregate quantities of the 
commodities consumed with lump-sum redistribution. In the closed economy, 
consumption is equal to production for each product, so the social welfare fiinction is 
defined on xo and x；, ieS. The welfare fiinction is assumed to be separable between the 
homogeneous good and the differentiated products from the set S, that is, 
U = U{x^,V{x,,x^,...,x,...)). (3) 
U is assumed to be quasi-concave and twice difFerentiable. Besides, Xo and V are 
assumed everywhere normal in U. Sub-utility fonction is defined as 
V = Z v , ( x J (4) 
i€S 
with V/，(x,) > 0 and v/,(x,) < 0. Fis additive separable with v,(0) = 0, V/(x/) increasing, 
strictly concave and twice difFerentiable for all ieS. 
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The budget constraint can be written as 
n 
PoXo + Y^PiXi + M = A)Z + T+M (5) 
i=\ 
where Z is the endowment of the economy in terms of the homogeneous good, Tis the 
transfer income, M is the money supply and M is the nominal money holdings. There 
are n commodities from S available. 
Besides, we have the cash-in-advance constraint 
n 
^^i^o%+^^2ZiAi, = M . (6) 
/=i 
The cash-in-advance constraint states that the transaction of good 0 and good i should 
be financed by cash for at least a certain part of consumption purchases. We have 
^yG[0,l],y = 1, 2, denoting the constant share of purchases of the homogeneous good 
and the differentiated products. In general,么本(jh. That is, cash balance requirements 
for the homogeneous and the differentiated products are different. j 
< 
Utility maximization gives price of the /th product (see Appendix) 
P i - q y : i ^ i ) ^ (7) 
i + x 
where 1 + y 二 i i ^ and y - —~~—，while q = q(xo, V) is the marginal rate of 
! + ¢^ 1 1 + ^S 
substitution between Xo and sub-utility V in the fiinction U, P. = — is the relative 
Po 
price of good i in terms of good 0, and v,'(X/) is the derivative of v,(x,). 
3.3 Equilibrium 
For the homogeneous good industry, firms face the following profit function: 
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n , = p , x , - c M i f x , >0 
r i o : 0 ifXo - 0 (8) 
where Xo is the quantity produced by each firm. Firms in this industry equate price to 
marginal cost, with zero profits earned. Thus, 
A ) = � W � 
p , X , - c , ( X , ) ^ 0 . (10) 
We turn to the production side of the monopolistic industry. Firms in this 
industry face the following profit functions: 
n , -7^Poq^ i ‘ (^ , ) ^ i (1 - t i ) - ^ i ( ^ / ) - ^ . if& >0 
1+^ 
n, - 0, ifx, =o (11) 
I 
where ti is the tax rate on the zth commodity expressed as a proportion of the market | 
[ 
price while - ^ / ? o ^ , '(jc.) is the price of this commodity. Tax revenues from the ！ 
1 + , 1 
I j 
monopolistic commodities and profits for firms in this industry together form the : 
transfer income. The transfer income that enters the budget constraint is defined as 
r = t ( K + n , ) (12) 
/=i 
where 7, = tixpi is the tax revenue from the zth commodity 
We have the following three assumptions for the firms in the monopolistic 
industry: 
(1) Symmetry 
For all i = 1, ..., n in the economy, we have Fi = Fk, h = 4, v/(x/) = vjXpCk\ 
ci(xi) = Ck(xk), for all domestically produced 1 and k e S such that xi , Xk > 0. 
Under the assumption of symmetry, it follows that Xi = Xk and pi = pk for all /, k 
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produced domestically. Since we have strict concavity of v, with strictly convex 
indifferent surfaces followed, 1 and k are not perfect substitutes even though the 
production technologies and demand characteristics are symmetric. Besides, 
under this assumption, the sub-utility function for each variety is the same 
across varieties. Together with the concave property which reflects diminishing 
marginal utility from any one variety, the economy is better off the larger the 
number of varieties given the budget constraint. That is, the welfare of the 
economy will be improved given a larger n with smaller x's. Obviously, the 
"love of variety" approach is incorporated in the modeL^ 
(2) Large group case 
I 
The number of commodities produced domestically is assumed to be large. For ‘ 
s 
'i 
n is large, the effect of a change in the price of one variety on the marginal | li y 
utility of income can be safely neglected given the utility function (3) and the | 
! 
sub-ijtility fiinction (4). On the other hand, the effect of the price of a variety I 
on the demand of other varieties will be negligible with a large n. Thus, the 
cross-price elasticity of demand for each variety approaches zero if n is very 
large. For the cross-price effects are negligible, the case of oligopoly is ruled 
out and there is no significant strategic interaction between firms and that is the 
feature of monopolistic competition/ Besides, for n is large, we can assume q, 
the marginal rate of substitution between x � a n d V’ will not be affected by 
change in output of any one commodity, since this output is relatively small to 
the total output of the industry. On the other hand, with a large n, we will have 
3 See Vousden，p.l53. The love of variety approach is based on the work of Spence (1976) and Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), and was used to explain trade in differentiated products by others. 
4 See Vousden, p.l54 and p.284. 
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n„ = 0 that firms earn zero profits. If n„ > 0, firms enter the industry until 
profits are driven to be zero, and the industry is left with a large n. 
(3) The profit functions, n,, are strictly concave in x, for Xj > 0. 
Under the above assumptions, all firms in the industry equate marginal revenue 
to marginal cost, with zero profits earned. Therefore, 
Pi (1 - ti ) | l + ^ ^ } = c,, (x,.), i = 1,. •.，n (13) 
1 v o o J 
/ 7 . ( l - ^ . X " C . ( x . ) - F . =0, i = l,...,n. (14) 
The first equation gives the equilibrium outputs for firms in the industry while the 
second gives the equilibrium number of commodities produced. Note that, with the 
presence of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, the equilibrium is 
not the social optimum. 
I 
. ！ 
3.4 Open Economy ‘ 
In this part, we extend the model to an open economy in which the 
homogeneous commodity, good 0, is exported, and the m differentiated products with 
label j = s,…，s + m from the set S are imported. At the same time, products from S 
are produced domestically with label i = 1，...，n. For the 7th commodity to the 
economy, Cj denotes the unit cost while Xj denotes the quantity imported. Assumptions 
(1) 一 (3) will still be taken to hold for domestically produced commodities while (1) 
and (2) will be held for imported commodities. That is, all differentiated products 
produced in the foreign country are assumed to be symmetric on the one hand, and the 
number of differentiated products, m, is assumed to be large on the other hand. 
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Differentiated products from the same economy are symmetric; however, these two 
groups will not be assumed symmetric to each other. 
In order to capture the idea that the cash balances for the importable and the 
exportable are not the same in general, we assume that the economy will not export 
differentiated products when the economy is open to trade. Thus, it engages in inter-
industry trade, exporting the homogeneous good and importing differentiated 
products. The total cost of imports to the economy, mcjXj, should be included when we 
consider the supply of the homogeneous commodity available to the economy. The 
consumption of good 0, JCo, can be expressed as 
Po^G = PoZ - n(c. (x.) + F,)- mCjX^ (15) 
The social welfare fimction may now be written as 
t/=:t/(Xo,m^,(x,.) + m v “ x � ) (16) 
I 
i 
Tariffs may be employed for imports such that there may be difference between [ 
!) 
• 
the market price of imports, pj, and the resource cost, Cj, to the economy. That is, 
p M - t ^ ) ^ c ^ (17) 
where tj is the tariff rate as a proportion of the market price. 
The budget constraint for the open economy becomes 
PoXQ +nppCi ^mpjXj +M=p^Z+M+T (18) 
The transfer income in the budget constraint, T, is now expressed as 
T = nJ]+mJ]. (19) 
with Ti the transfer income from the /th commodity and 7} the total revenue from the 
7'th commodity. Besides, the CIA constraint is 
+vPoXQ + <t>2^,i + <km>,j = M. (20) 
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Utility maximization with constraints gives prices (see Appendix) 
5 = W V , ) 7 ^ /二1,".," (21) 
\^y 
Pj =^;'(^/)7^ j = s,...,m (22) 
】 J ^ 1 + 厂 
where 1 + , = i ± ^ , P^  = ^ and 尸 , = ^ . 
! + ¢^1 Po Po 
Compare the autarky equilibrium with the trade equilibrium. We can find that 
they have a unique solution /?； and x, in each equilibrium. With assumptions (1) - (3), 
the profit maximization and the zero profit conditions stated in (13) and (14), which 
give Pi and x,, hold in each equilibrium. Under the assumption of strict concavity of the 
profit functions they have a unique solution. It follows that in each equilibrium, we 
have the same pi and x,. The effect of trade on the monopolistically competitive 
industry is only to change the number of commodities produced. For the competitive 
( 
industry, each firm faces the same profit maximization and zero profit conditions stated ‘ 
in (9) and (10) in each equilibrium. A unique solution of /?o and X^ is yielded. Besides, 
given the value of 厂，with the same pi, x,., and po, comparison of (7) and (21) leads the 
result that the marginal rate of substitution between Xo and V, denoted by q, must be 
the same in each equilibrium. Therefore，we can conclude that both of the equilibria are 
on the same Engel curve of U (see Figure 1). 
Consider the welfare effect of trade for this economy. That is，we want to find 
the change in welfare when the economy open to trade from autarky. Totally 
differentiating the social welfare function (16) yields 
dU = U ^ + U^v. (x. )dn + U^v. {x. )dm. (23) 
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Putting the CIA constraint in (20) into the budget constraint in (18) and differentiating 
it, we obtain 
< = _ ( ( l + # x , A + (l + y)Pyjc/m). (24) 
Substituting (24) into (23) yields:^ 
—二 -r[p,x,dn + PjXjdm)+ {qv, (x,) - P,x, )dn + {qv.(x^) - PjX^ )dm. (25) 
U\ 
According to (25), the welfare effect of trade has three components. The second and 
the third terms are the welfare effects related to monopolistic competition of the 
differentiated product industry. The first term represents the effect on welfare due to 
the existence of a CIA constraint. If there is no CIA distortion, this term vanishes 
I (h — (h \ 
sincey = will become zero. The CIA distortion can be illustrated by Figure 2 
1 + S^ ！ 
and Figure 3. The welfare of free trade in a monetary economy is lower than that of a ‘ 
'i i 
barter economy in both of the cases with ¢^  > (jh and 办 < ^i. | 
9 
5 Note that dpo, dpi, dXj are zero since we have shown that the autarky equilibrium and the trade 
equilibrium have unique solutions pu Xj, po andXo. Besides, for the small open economy supply price 
of imports, Cj, is fixed, pj will not change if tj is unchanged. JfPj is unchanged, from equation (22)， 
Xj will not change also. Thus dpj and dxj are zero. 
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Chapter 4. Optimal Production Taxation 
We have derived the equilibrium of the economy. In this part, as a comparison, 
the social optimum will be derived. The assumptions stated will still be valid in this 
part. To the economy, since we have the assumption of symmetry and the property of 
concavity for the sub-utility function, and thus diminishing marginal utility from any 
one variety, the more the varieties produced in the economy given the budget 
constraint and the CIA constraint, the higher the welfare. However, for each product 
to be produced, there is a fixed cost incurred. Thus, only some varieties from S will be 
produced. There should be a social optimal number of firms. Besides, for each good to 
1 
be produced, there is a social optimal output. For the closed economy, the social 
optimum is obtained when the output of a representative firm, X/, and the number of 
firms, n are chosen to maximize welfare subject to the resource constraint and the CIA i 
I 
constraint of the economy. Given (2), the consumption of the homogeneous good in ； 
terms of the resources of the economy and the total production costs of the 
differentiated products, the social welfare fiinction in (3), can be written as 
u = u[-(^,Z 一n[cXx,) + F)l /7V,.(X)] (26) 
VA y^  
The budget constraint for the economy in (5) can be expressed as 
p^Z - n{c^(x,.) + F . ) + np^x^ + M = p^Z + T + M. (27) 
The CIA constraint in (6) becomes 
¢. {Po^ - n{c^ (x,.) + R)) + 4>^iXi = M. (28) 
Differentiating the Lagrangian fiinction with respect to x, gives (see Appendix) 
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^ ^ 二 ^ ⑷ （29) 
( i+r) 
1 义 X 丄 
中 \ 
w h e r e a = \ " i \ - ^ . 
h7-w/u-jT/o<h 
On the other hand, differentiating with respect to n yields (see Appendix) 
qVi {x,) = f — + 丢 { ¢ , - A )](c ,(义)+ Fi ) . (30) 
\Po ^1 J 
Equations (29) and (30) give the social optimal quantity produced for each 
commodity and the optimal number of commodities produced respectively, while the 
equilibrium defmed by (13) and (14) give the firm's optimal quantity produced for each 
i 
commodity and the zero profit condition. The latter is not the social optimum since ； 
firms are under imperfect competition with the presence of increasing returns to scale. 
I V ^ 
In general, decentralization of the optimum requires two policy instruments，one for j 
t • 
the optimal X/ while the other for the optimal n. In this paper, we use a production tax 
to optimize the number of commodities produced, given x[ That is, an ad valorem tax 
is used such that the number of domestic firms determined by the zero profit condition 
given by (14) gives the optimal number defined by (30). 
By (14) and (30), the optimal production taxation for the economy is given as 
(see Appendix) 
� l _ J ^ ^ _ _ ( l ± r ) _ _ (31) 
v-(x,.)x,. r 1 ,A “ � ) ) 
i+77"Po(02-^z^i) 
V U\ J 
or it can be rewritten as 
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, � � + T i ^ ( “ i ) � 
t; = 1 - 咖 ） ) 1 + 於1 1 (31,) 
他 1 + “ ( “ ) 
V ^ 1 J 
. ¢2 一 ^ 1 
since r =————. 
1 + ^S 
If the tax rate is set equal to the optimal tax rate, the optimal number of firms is 
obtained, however, with x, left apart from the optimal one. Thus, the economy is not in 
the first-best situation. Nevertheless, the optimal number of firms is retrieved. The 
following proposition is immediate: 
Proposition 1 
If production taxation is the only policy instrument used in the closed economy in 
order to obtain the optimal number of monopolistically produced commodities, then 
the optimal tax rate is negative for ¢^  < ¢1. For 么 > ^i, the optimal tax rate is negative 
V.(X) 1 + 和 (於 2 — ^ 0 
if and only if ~"-~~-~~ > ^ . The optimal tax rate is zero if 
^ A # z l ^ ^ { ¢ . - ¢ . ) 
1 + ^ 1 
v.(x.) 1 + 亲厂。(於2-^0 
~"-~"-^ = for (jyi > ¢1. If ¢2 = 01, the optimal tax rate is negative. 
V,'(X>, 1 + ^ ( 0 2 - ^ 0 
1 + ^ 1 
Proof 
As we have only one policy instrument which is used to optimize the number of 
commodities produced, the optimal quantity for each commodity is not achieved, and 
thus (29) does not hold. For these firms are under monopolistic competition, the 
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quantity produced by each firm is less than optimum. Increasing production would 
increase social welfare. Hence, equation (29) becomes an inequality, and it follows that 
(see Appendix) 
告，>l4' (32) 
Together with the fact that ”'(义‘）> 1, the results are immediate. Q.E.D. 
v"(x,)x,. 
To conclude, for 么 < ¢ ,^ the optimal tariff is negative. However, for ¢2 > ¢1, 
the result is ambiguous that /,* will be negative only under certain conditions. For 
¢2 > ¢1, ti^ = 0 is possible in the rare case. 
The intuition is as follows. Utility maximization gives (l + ,)7^ =們 ' 0 0 . 
I 
When there is the CIA distortion, consumer demand depends on the virtual price, : 
(l + /)F., instead ofthe market price, F,. If ^ < ¢1, the virtual price ofthe /th product | 
w 
in terms of the homogeneous good is smaller than the market price, that is, 
(1 + y)Pi < Pi. Utility maximization yields a larger demand for the monopolistic good 
with the CIA distortion than without the distortion. However, since the firm considers 
market price instead of the virtual price, quantity supplied would be too small. Thus, 
negative tax rate is employed such that the marginal revenue faced by each firm 
increases and the equilibrium output will be raised. On the other hand, negative tax rate 
can increase the number of domestically produced monopolistic goods. Since these 
two effects work in the same direction, negative tax rate is employed when ¢2 < ¢1. 
If (jyi > ¢1, the virtual price of the /th monopolistic good is greater than the 
market price, that is，（1 + y)P^ > P .^ Utility maximization yields a smaller demand for 
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the monopolistic good with (jh > ¢1 than without the CIA distortion. When the firm 
considers the market price, quantity supplied would be too large. Therefore, positive 
tax rate can decrease the marginal revenue faced by each firm and thus the equilibrium 
output of each variety. However, negative tax rate can increase the number of goods 
produced domestically. As the two effects work in opposite directions, the result is 
ambiguous. If the CIA distortion is large, the possibility for 
l + ^ A ^ W � ） 仏 ⑷ 
> ~"•~~-^ is large and the optimal tax rate should be positive. If 
i + T ^ ( “ ） 作 ) 1 ' 
1 + ^1 
l + * A ) ( ^ ^ 2 - ^ 0 “幻 
the CIA distortion is small, the possibility for \ < ^ 八 “ i s large, 
i + r ^ ( A - A ) 伪 ‘ ) ' ' 
i+^>i 
义 
i + y A ) G ^ 2 - 0 i ) “ 
and thus the optimal tax rate should be negative. If = ^ ' “ ， f 
1 + ^ ( 么 - 么 ） （ ( 作 ^ 
the two effects just cancel each other out and the optimal tax rate should be zero. 
If (k = <h, although we have the CIA constraint, there is no CIA distortion 
with y = 0，oegative tax rate can increase the number of goods produced and thus the 
optimal tax rate will be negative just as the case without CIA constraint. 
For the special case in which the sub-utility functions for each variety, V/(x/) and 
Vj(Xj) are iso-elastic with 
^ i (x , ) = x ' ' where 0 . e (0,1) 
M i j ) = 1 广 where 0^ e (o,l), 
equation (31，) becomes 
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1 i + T^T(A-^) 
" = l - * H f ^ — — { (33) 
‘ \ ~ ^ Y ^ p M i - ^ i ) 
For ¢2 > ¢1, the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal tax rate to be 
negative becomes 
义 
^+yrPo(^2-^i) , - > ~ ^ . 
没’ i + i i " ( " i ) 
1+^1 
Note that ft and 6j are constant. 
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Chapter 5. Welfare Effect ofTrade and the Optimal Tariff 
The comparisons in Chapter 4 between the autarky equilibrium and the trade 
equilibrium give the conclusion that, instead of affecting the prices and quantities 
produced for those firms already in active, the effect of trade on the monopolistically 
competitive industry is only to change the number of commodities produced with q 
constant. Although the CIA constraint is imposed into the model, the above conclusion 
is the same as if there is no such constraint. Thus, we can follow Venables's model in 
this section to derive the optimal tariff rate, but with the CIA constraint in addition. 
5.1Welfare Effect oftrade 
To examine the welfare effect on trade, we use the A operator to denote the 
difference in the value of a variable between the equilibria with and without trade. 
Hence，we have (see Appendix) 
^ 0 ^- [ -{cX^i)+F)^n-mc.x^) (34) 
Po 
AV = v,(xJAfj + mv.(x.). (35) 
•'； 
Here, Axo is the change in the consumption of the homogeneous good when the 
economy is open to trade, while AVis the change in sub-utility. 
When the economy is open to trade, it faces competition from aboard. Hence, 
the number of domestically produced commodities will decrease, as some of the 
domestic firms in the monopolistic industry will be forced out ofthe domestic market. 
Note that -An is the number of domestic firms that are forced out ofthe market. 
From (35), we have 
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AV — mv, (x,) 
N n : ^ ^ . (36) 
v,(A) 
Substituting (36) into (34) gives 
1 ( , / A F - ^ , ( x , ) Y l 
Ax,=— - m c . x . - { c X x , ) + F i — — y ^ . (37) 
PoV \ ^X^i) JJ 
Since the equilibria with and without trade lie on the same Engel curve of U, a 
particular Engel curve may be written as 
V-g{x , ) . (38) 
Since Xo are assumed everywhere normal in U, ^ ' (½) > • . Along an Engel curve we 
therefore have 
AV = g\a)Ax, (39) 
where a G [ Xo, Xo + Axo], Putting (37) into (39), we have 
1 f , / A F - w v , ( x , ) ^ ^ 
A^ 二 g,(a) mc .x. — (c,(X,) + F, 1 , ； . (40) 
M \ 咖 ） ) ) 
Thus, 
Vy0s)(c,00+i^) f p^ c,(x,)+i^l , � 
m — m c . x , = A V - ^ ^ + - ？ ^ ~ ~ - ( 4 1 ) 
v, W ‘ � [ g \ a ) v,(x,) J � ) 
Making use of (14) and (17) together with (7), (21) and (22), we can rewrite (41) as 
(see Appendix) 
^ ^ ^ 户 4 樂 ( 1 - 0 - ^ ^ ^ ( 1 -Ol = Av(^ + 彻)+ 巧](42) 
( i + r ) 1 v , . 0 O � “ v “ x � � " J U ' ( ^ ) v , ( x , ) , ) 
m^(Xf)Po f p c (x )+F.^ 
Since ~ Y ^ ~ ~ \ ^ a n d ~ ^ + ' ' '； � ' are positive, AVin (42) is positive if and 
(l + r) \g(a) v.(x.) J 
only if 
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( l - O ^ - ( l - O ^ > 0 - (43) v,(x,) v.(x.) 
That is, the equilibrium with trade has a higher level of social welfare than the 
equilibrium without trade if and only if the above inequality holds. Following the 
analysis, Proposition 2 examines the welfare effect of free trade. 
Proposition 2 
Iftaxation policy is used to optimize the number of domestic products produced, that 
is, ti = A*, and (j>i < ¢1, then free trade increases social welfare. If t| = /；* and ^ > 办， 
1 + 1 ^ ^ (么 -么） v , ( X . ) L 
then free trade increases social welfare if and only if ；^^ > ———-~~-. If 
1 + & 。 ( 1 於 ） 、 ( " 》 
(jh = ¢1, free trade increases social welfare. 
Proof 
Set ti equal to the optimal taxation stated in equation (31，），that is, 
l+~^~fe -¢0 
“ 广 ： 1 - 彻 ） 1 + 於 
‘ ‘ v / ( ^ , K - L ^ , . ^ , y 
1+77户。(么-戎） 
V U\ J 
For free trade, set tj = 0. Condition (43) becomes 
6 i^ (^ i) 
~ - ~ - ~ may be interpreted as the ratio of the /th commodity's revenue ( and hence costs) to that 
^i K^i )^i 
commodity's revenue plus consumer surplus. For the interpretation of this condition, see Venables 
1982. ‘ 36 
' + \ h � U ) v/OQXj 
1 + ^ 凡 从 - « v ) ( " � 
X 1 v.'(x.)jc. 
Since we have——p^ > and ———-~~- < 1, the results are immediate. Q.E.D. 
U , ! + ¢^1 V j ( X j ) 
In conclusion, for 么 < ^i, we have social welfare improved with free trade. 
However, if ¢2 > ¢1, the social welfare may or may not be increased with free trade, 
1 + 1：4^(么_於） v\x)x 
depending on the values of ^ ^ a n d � — — - ~ - . 
l + $ A X A - ^ ) � ( x � 
"1 
When the economy is open to trade, the number of variety available increases 
and thus the welfare will be increased in general. However, when the economy is open 
to trade, it faces competition from aboard. The number of domestically produced 
commodities will decrease, as some of the domestic firms in the monopolistic industry 
will be forced out of the domestic market. If ¢^  > 办，following the previous analysis, 
(1 + Y) Pj> Pj, importation of the monopolistic goods is too large in amount that may 
decrease the social welfare. In the case with free trade decreases social welfare, there 
will be no trade at all. 
Consider the special case with iso-elastic sub-utility functions defined 
previously. If ti = /；•* stated in (33), and ¢2 > ¢1, the necessary and sufficient condition 
for free trade to increase social welfare becomes 
i + r : ^ ( H i ) 1+^1 � “ 
" ~ I 〉没厂 
hjj^pMr<K) 
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It should be noted that even if free trade increases social welfare when the 
i + r f ^ ( A -《） V / ( - ) -
economy is open to trade, given ： ^ > ———-~~- when ¢2 > 小\, there 
l + ^ A ^ ( l A ) � ( " � 
remain imperfections in the domestic economy. Imperfections exist in that economy 
since we have distortions in both the production side and the consumption side. The 
imperfections are caused by the imperfect competition and the CIA distortion, and are 
reflected as the sub-optimality of the number of commodities produced and the 
quantities of each commodity produced. Production tax policy is used to optimize the 
number of commodity produced domestically only, leaving the quantity in which each 
commodity produced uncontrolled. Besides, the CIA distortion is not corrected by 
offsetting the source of distortion directly. Nevertheless, it is possible that free trade 
improves social welfare. 
5.2 Optimal Import Tariff 
In the last section, tariff is introduced into the model with trade. We have also 
found that free trade may improve welfare. We would like to know whether free trade 
is the optimal policy for this economy as in the non-distorted small open economy. 
This is the task for this section. 
We assume that the economy under consideration is a price-taker in 
international trade. Analytically, non-zero tariff should be desirable in this model since 
there are imperfections in the domestic economy. The imposition of tarifFis a second-
best policy in correcting these imperfections. We have discussed that using tax policy 
as an instrument to correct domestic imperfections is not sufficient for free trade to be 
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optimal although free trade may improve welfare. Besides, the use of tariff would be 
sound if the number of commodities imported to the economy can be affected by the 
tariff rate. That is, tax policy is used to deal with the distortion caused by monopolistic 
competition in the domestically produced commodities through the optimization of the 
number of commodities, while tariff can be used to affect the number of imported 
commodities under the distortion with monopolistic competition in the imported 
commodities. 
We would like to find a tariff t f which maximizes social welfare subject to the 
resource constraint given domestic tax t[ The market price of the imports, pj, is taken 
as the control variable. It is because, for the small open economy, supply price of 
imports, Cy, is fixed. Then, controlling pj is equivalent to controlling tj. 
When pj is changed, the quantity of each commodity imported will generally 
change. Besides, the revenues for those foreign firms supplying the imports will change 
li ,'! 
also. Since these firms face increasing returns to scale in either production or export of \ 
their outputs, the number of commodities supplied, m, will depend on the quantities 
sold, Xj, generally. However, to the domestic economy, the response of the number of 
commoditiea imported, m, to Xj is taken as exogenous. This response can be expressed 
as an elasticity of the number of commodities imported with respect to the quantity of 
each commodity imported, denoted as 
dm ^i 八 
rj 二 “；~ ~ - > 0 (44) 
aXj m 
In the previous section, we have discussed that x,- and pi are the same in 
equilibria with and without trade. Thus, we come to the conclusion that both x； and Pi 
are also unchanged by changes in pj. Only the number of commodities produced 
39 
domestically, n, will in general change as pj changes. Of course, as discussed, the way 
of change in n is such that q is held constant, that is，the economy is held on the same 
Engel curve. Since along an Engel curve U(Xo，V) is strictly increasing in both Xo and V, 
the optimal tariff problem can be reduced to the problem of maximizing xo, under the 
constraint that the economy is on the same Engel curve. 
That is，we choosepj to maximize (15), which can be rewritten as: 
^0 = — {p^Z-rip, {x.)+F.)-mc x ) 
Po 
subject to (38) which can be expressed as 
nvXx,) + mVj(Xj) = g -{p,Z-r(c.(^i) + ^ i)-^<^j^j) (45) 
v^o y ) 
.1 
) 
with three variables n, m, and Xj. \ 
To maximize Xo, we differentiate the objective function, and for optimality，we 
•J 
dX^ , |n 
set ~~- equal to zero: 丨丄 
dPj -
dXr, 1 ( dn / , � � dx., �� 
^ : — — — ( ^ , (^,) + ^ ) — mCj ~ ^ (1 + ") = 0. (46) 
dPj A)l^ ^Pj ^Pj J 
Thus, 
< ^ dx \ 
- ^ (c' ( \ ) + ^ ) - " 7 � ^ (1 + n) = 0. (47) 
1 ^ p j ^PJ J 
On the other hand, differentiating the constraint yields 
- # f v , . ( x , . ) + ( c , ( x , ) + i ^ , l ] = " 7 > f # l c , ( l + 7 7 ) + v , , O s ) + ^ ^ ) (48) 
^Pj[ PoJ ^Pj[ Po ^j J 
Substituting (47) into (48) gives 
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_ = � ( i ' ) + 6 f l + " 讽 ） 1 (49) 
v / ( x � V.(x,) 1^  x , v / ( x . ) j 
In this stage, we can make use of the import demand equation and the zero 
profit condition for domestic producers to incorporate the tax rate for domestic 
products and the tariff rate for imported products into the equation. 
Given (17) and (22), the import demand equation can be expressed as 
c " ^ ^ “ ） （5。） 
' i i 
Substituting the price function for domestic products in (21) into (14)，the zero profit 
condition for domestic producers becomes : 
1 
c,. (x^) + Fi = ^ 1 - ti )x,v. ‘ {x, )p, - ^ • (51) ； 
1 + r ) 
I 
• I 
Substituting (50) and (51) into (49) we have the first-order condition for the optimal 
tariff tj* (see Appendix) 1 
“ * ) = : ^ Z L ^ “ J ： ^ ] 脚 ‘ 
\ � , ( 1 + ") V,.(x,) L ^,V/(X.)J 
which is the same as if there is no CIA constraint. Up to this stage, we can conclude 
that the first-order conditions for the optimal tariff jfy* are the same with and without 
the CIA constraint, since y entered the two sides of equation (52) cancel each other 
out. However, we should not conclude that the values of the optimal tariff in these two 
cases are necessarily the same. Indeed, the values of ¢1 and (jh are important 
components in determining the value of /y*. This will be discussed later. 
First of all, we would like to consider the welfare effect of the optimal tariff 
and make a comparison between optimal tariff and optimal taxation discussed 
previously. This gives the following proposition. 
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Proposition 3 
The equilibrium with trade has a higher level of social welfare than the equilibrium 
without trade if optimal tariff is used as the only policy instrument. It may not true if 
optimal taxation is the only policy. 
Proof 
v ( x ) 
Equation (52) gives the optimal tariff Since ^ - ~ ~ - ^ > 1, we have (see Appendix) 
� y . ( ~ ) 
(l — , , ) ^ ) \ ( W , ) ^ i ^ 1 
^ � ) v , ( x , ) � J v,.(x,.) 
I 




/ � v '0c-�jc. / X V,- ‘ (x ,• )x ,• 
only if (1- / , ) I � “ ， - ( 1 - ^ ) J “ J > 0 . If optimal tariff is used, the above , 
v,00 ^ J, Vj{Xj) 
] 
^ 
inequality holds regardless of the value of U Thus, importation with an optimal tariff as i 
r T ^ . 
the only instrument will improve social welfare. Note that this result will not be 
affected whether ti, the other policy instrument, is used optimally or not. For optimal 
taxation, proposition 2 has showed that if (jh < 伞\, free trade increases social welfare. 
However, if ¢2�<j>u free trade may not increase social welfare. In this case, free trade 
improves welfare only under certain conditions. Q.E.D. 
The intuition is as follows. If optimal tariff is used, the number of imported 
commodities is optimally controlled. Thus, the competition faced will never be too 
large that the welfare of the economy will be decreased. However, this cannot be 
ensured if only the optimal taxation is used. 
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We have found that the optimal tariff improves social welfare when the 
economy is open to trade. Then, we would like to ask, given /,, what would the 
optimal tariffbe. Thus, we have the following propositions. 
Proposition 4 
If rj = 0，and production taxation policy is used to optimize the number of domestic ^ 
•J 
products produced, that is,心=/, *，then the optimal tariff is positive for ^ > ¢1, and | 







From (52), we have ‘ 
‘ / 
t . * = i — i ^ f Z L ^ _ Y i + “ M i � 1 ^ 
‘ l + "L V,(x,)人 v ; { x . ) x . ) ；] 
f 1 ^ ！ 
. . 1 + 1 ^ ( 0 2 - A ) 
Setting 77 二 0, and t. = t ; = l - ~ 训 ） ) ^ ( given by (31’)，the 
V.'(x.)x. f A 1 
^ + T7-Po(A-^l) 
V U\ 7 
optimal tarifFbecomes 
( 1 ^ 
l + T T T ( A - ^ ) 
r - i ^ 1+么 J 
— ( 1 ^ 
1+77-^ 0(^ 2^-^ 1^) 
V U\ J 
^ 1 
Since we have ——p�> ，the results follow. Q.E.D. 
U , 1 + ^ z^i 
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When ^ = ^i, we have the same result as if there is no CIA constraint. 
However, when ^ 方办，we find that the optimal tariff should be non-zero, depending 
on the value of 么 and ^i. That is, the optimal tariff should be positive if ^ > 4>\. On 
the other hand, it should be negative if ¢^  < ¢1. The intuition is as follows. For rj = 0, 
the domestic economy cannot affect the number of commodities imported. Thus, the 
optimality of free trade can be ensured with the number of domestic commodities 
produced controlled optimally, when ¢2 = ¢1 • However, when ^ 关 #i, even if 77 = 0， 
optimal control of the number of domestic commodities is not sufficient to ensure the 
optimality of free trade due to the CIA distortion. 
I 
Utility maximization gives (1 + y)Pj = qvj • {xj). If 么 < ^i, the virtual price of 
� 
the yth impofted monopolistic good in terms of the homogeneous good is smaller than \ 
\ 




then without the CIA distortion. However, the amount of imported good depends on ^ 
tdr 
H*' 
the market price instead of the virtual price. Negative tariff rate promotes importation 
of each variety. 
If (jh < ¢1, virtual price of the 7th imported monopolistic good is greater than 
the market price, that is, (l + y)Pj > P]. Demand for the good should be smaller than 
without this distortion. Positive tariff rate can reduce the amount of each good 
imported. 
If ^ :二 ^i, and (1 + /) 二 1, the virtual price is just the same as the market price. 
There is no CIA distortion. Besides, since rj = 0, the number of imported monopolistic 
goods cannct be affected by the tariff rate. Thus, the optimal tariff rate should be zero. 
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The above proposition gives the value of optimal tariff when rj 二 0. We now 
turn to the case if rj > 0. 
Proposition 5 
If rj > 0，and production taxation policy is used to optimize the number of domestic 
products produced, so /, = /,*，then the optimal tariff is negative for <j>i < ¢1. For 
( jh�¢1, the optimal tariff is negative if and only if 
1+余"。(“1) 1 f v A ^ 
< — 1 + 7 7 ^ - ~ ~ - ~ " . 
1 + 丄 (於 2 -於） l + "L V / ( X � X J 
1+^ 2^ 1 
� + ^ p M 2 - < h ) 1 r v ( r ) ) 
For (fyi > ^i, and if = l + 77 ~~-~~-——，the optimal tariff is 
i + r V l " i + " L ' “ 她 」 
1+01 
zero. If ^ = ¢1, the optimal tariffis negative. 
Proof 
f 1 ^ 
. . l + 7 7 r ( ^ 2 - ^ , ) 
Recall (52). Setting /, : /； = 1 — � ' ' ( ' " � { , we have 
� V O O i , f i ^ 2 , , , J 
1 + 77^)(^^2 -4>\、 
\ "丨 
( 1 ^ 
1 + 厂了(么—於）1 f ( � � 
/ / ^ 1 - ^ ^ — — ^ 丄 1 + " ^ ^ . 
� i + * A ^ - ^ ) y + " L ^ v ( ^ > j 
A 1 V • (x •) 
With ——Po > and ~^-~~-~~ > 1, the results are yielded. Q.E.D. 
U, \ + 4>, - V ’ y ( � 
45 
In conclusion, if 么 < ^i, the optimal tariff is negative. However, if ¢2 = ^i, ^ * 
will be negative only under certain conditions. It is still possible to have the case with 
zero optimal tariff. 
Note that if rj > 0，the number of commodities imported can be affected by the 
trade policy. Thus, the optimal tariff is non-zero in general. 
The intuition of the proposition is as follows. If f^c < ¢1, following the previous ！ 
) 
analysis, importation of each variety will be too small in amount. Negative tariff can i 
.1 
promote quantity imported for each variety. On the other hand, negative tariff can : 
’ i 
, , i 
increase the number of imported monopolistic goods and increase welfare in turn/ ] 
4 
Hence, these two effects working in the same direction result in a negative optimal ’ 
； 
tariff rate. j 
If (j>2 > ¢1, the amount of import will be too large for each variety. To reduce . 
'1 j 




increase the number of varieties imported. The net effect of these opposite effects is 乂 
ambiguous. If the CIA distortion is large, it is likely that 
h | p M r < ^ ) 1 r ( ) ) 
> 1 + 77~"-~"-——and the optimal tariff should be positive. 
i + r V ( l A ) i+"L " ( ' > J 
1+^1 
On the other hand, if the CIA distortion is small, the possibility that 
7 Negative tariffs also means that imports are sold at prices below their marginal cost to the economy 
and that reduces weUare. The net effect of this and the increase in the number of imported 
monopolistic goods is a negative optimal tariff if we do not consider the CIA constraint. See 
Venables ,1982. 
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i + ; ^ A > G W i ) 1 f v ( r ) ) 
< l + ;7~~-~~-~~ is high, hence the optimal tariff should be 
i + r V t - A ) i + " k ' " ( ' � ' J 
1+01 
negative. 
i + # / a ^ W i ) 1 f ( ) ) 
In the case if \ = 1 + " ^ - ~ ~； ^ with (jn > ¢1, the two 
i + r V ( A - A ) i + " L " ( ' � ' J 
1+^1 
effects just cancel each other out, and thus the optimal tariff would be zero. It should 
be mentioned that free trade is optimal under the above condition but it does not in 
general hold for that distorted economy. Also note that if the above condition is 
satisfied and hence t j * = 0, proposition 2 is also satisfied that free trade improve 
social welfare (see Appendix). 
If ^ 二 ^i, there is no CIA distortion, and the only effect is that negative tariff 
can promote the number of imported goods. Thus, the optimal tariff would be 
negative. 
For the special case with iso-elastic sub-utility functions stated above, (52) can 
be rewritten as 
/ \ 
\ - t 1 
/ , * 二 1 ' - 0 , 1 + 7 7 — . 
J i + " i \ . J 
Setting ti = t, * given by (33), it becomes 
( 1 ^ 
i + T7T(02_^U 1 / ^ A 
, * . 1 _ L 2 i i 1 ^ ^ 1 ” 丄 1 
f 义 / 、）i + " e, 
1 + 7 7施 -於） 、 “ 
\ ^1 J V 
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For (jyi > ^i, the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal tariff to be negative 
is 
Y + ^ p j A - ^ Y ) ( \ 
^1 1 1 丄 \ < 1 + 7——. 
i + r V ( ^ 2 - A ) i+"L M 
i + A 
We have discussed previously that tariff is a second-best policy for that 
distorted economy since production taxation alone is not sufficient to bring the 
economy to its first-best situation. We now consider the case with this second-best 
policy used only. In the previous analysis, we conclude that even if /； = 0, the optimal 
tariff will improve social welfare with trade. Another question is what the value of the 
j 






If rj = 0，and production taxation is not used to affect the number of domestic products i 
produced, so h = 0 卞(*, then the optimal tarifF is positive, independent of the value of 
V (X ) v (x ) 
(jyi and ¢1. For 77 > 0, the optimal tariff is positive if ~~‘ > ^ - ~ ~ - ^ , again, 
v / ( ^ , K v/(^ ；)^ ； 
independent of the values of ¢2 and ¢1. 
Proof 
For 77 = 0, with ti 二 0, (52) becomes 
,* = i _ Z ^ : ^ ^ ^ > o . 
J v , (x , ) 
For rj > 0，with h = 0，we have 
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1 f V . ( x . ) ) 
r . * = l 7^ i + " � " > 0 
� ( i + " { l L � • ( � ) � 
� V , ( X , > J 
i f j ^ . 哄 ） . Q.E.D. 
v,'(^,k v/{x.)x^ 
From (52), we know that (1 + y) in both sides of the equation cancel each other 
out. Thus the values of ^ and ¢1 enter this equation only through t[ If /, = 0, t j , is 
independent of the values of <j>i and ¢1 then. 
If 77 二 0, the number of imported monopolistic goods, m, cannot be affected by 
tariff. Since ( = 0 本(*，production taxation is not used to obtain the optimal number of 
domestic products. Positive tariff should be employed so as to increase the number of 
commodities produced domestically. Thus, through the positive tariff, the total number 
of commodities supplied to the economy is raised, and the welfare is also improved.^ 
The CIA distortion is not to be corrected for the domestically produced monopolistic 
goods, so as the imported monopolistic goods. Hence, the values of (jh and ¢1 will not 
affect the results. 
If 77 > 0, the number of imported monopolistic goods can be affected by the 
tariff rate. If the ratio of surplus to cost is higher for domestically produced 
V (x ) V (x.) 
commodities than for imports, that is，^‘ ' > ^ - ~ " - ^ , then imports should be 
v,'(^/K v/(Xj)Xy 
taxed more heavily than domestic commodities. Recall AF in (42) is positive if and 
8 ]f rj = 0，the number of imported commodities, m, is given. The total number of commodities 
supplied to the economy can be increased by taxing imports since the number of domestically 
produced commodities can be increased, and that brings positive consumer surplus. See Venables, 
1982. 
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only if ( 1 一 , , 广 . ( � ) � - ( 1 - , / ) . ( � ~ > 0 . I f ^ i ^ ^ ^ > _ ^ ^ , t^ should 
^ i) V,(X,) ^ ” Vj{Xj) v,'(x,)x, v/{Xj)Xj 
be greater than /, to increase welfare. Since ti = 0 , � * should be positive. 
v(x) v ( x ) 
For rj > 0, consider the case if ~~‘ “ = ^ - ~ ~ - ^ , that is, the products are 
V/|(&K. v/(Xj)Xj 
V.(X) v ( x ) 
symmetric. If tj = ti = 0, as ~~^ “ 二 ~~-~"-^，（43) will be zero rather than 
^i'{^i)^i ^/(^j)Xj 
positive. That is, the changes in the numbers of commodities produced and imported 
will not change welfare. On the other hand, if U = 0 while positive tariff is employed, 
(43) will be greater than zero. In this case, imports become more valuable to the 
economy since their marginal valuation to consumers is raised. Hence, the ratio of 
1 
surplus to cost decreases. Therefore, even though the products are symmetric, t^ \ 
•i 
should be greater than /,. Thus, (43) will hold as inequality if and only if tj > ti given 
v(x) V/(X/) 
__LX_LL_ - .__ i__ i__ Since tf = 0, tj* should be positive. Again, the CIA distortion 
V/'(^/K Vj\Xj)Xj 
in both the domestically produced monopolistic goods and the imported monopolistic 
goods are not corrected. Thus, /y* is independent of the value of (jh and 办.Note that, 
in this case, the conditions for tj^ > ti = 0 with CIA distortion are the same as the case 
without CIA distortion.^ 
For the special case with iso-elastic sub-utility functions stated previously, (52) 
becomes 
/, = 1-", >0 
9 Venables has discussed the use of the optimal tariff as a second-best policy instrument to control the 
domestic economy if domestic tax is not optimally used. Conditions for tj* > A are stated. See 
Venables, 1982. 
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for rj > 0 and ti = 0. For rj > 0 and ti = 0, we have 
/ \ 
,, = 1—— ^ - 1 + 7 7 — 
(l + /;)lk ^J 
\ "0i 
It is positive if and only if Oi < Oj. 
As this model comes after Venables's one, we can make a comparison between 
I 
the two. If ¢2. = ¢1, ti and /)* in this model give the same results as Venables's one ； 
'} 
without the CIA constraint. However, since ^ 7^  ¢1 in general, there are some 1 
differences between the findings of Venables and this thesis. For ¢2 < ¢1, (* is negative ‘ 
j 
1 '1 
as in Venables's case. / , with 77 > 0 also yields the same results as Venables's that it is ； 
1) 
negative, while t , with 77 二 0 is negative rather than zero as suggested by Venables. J 
f / 
For (j>2 > ¢1, if;* and tf with rj > 0 give Venables's results only under certain conditions, � 
while tj* with rj = 0 gives positive value rather than zero. Moreover, when ,/ = /,* free 丨 
trade increases social welfare as in Venables's case if 办 < ¢1. For ¢^  > ¢1, free trade ！ 
increases social welfare only under certain conditions. It can be concluded that 
introducing money and cash balances into the model alters the results Venables 
obtained. The optimal production taxation and the optimal tarifF will be affected by the 
value of cash balances. 
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Chapter 6. Consumption Tax 
In the previous sections, we have introduced the use of optimal domestic 
production taxation and optimal import tariff to maximize the welfare of the economy. 
We find that if optimal domestic taxation is used only, the welfare will be improved 
with trade if f^c < 办;however, if ¢^  > ¢1, welfare will be improved only under certain 
conditions. On the other hand, if optimal tariff is used as the only instrument, welfare ； 
;� 
will be improved (see Proposition 3). We can conclude that if both of the instruments 
are used optimally, the welfare of the economy can be maximized. 
Another question raised is that whether the welfare can further be improved if 
:•1 
some other instruments are available also. In this model, one should mention that there ‘ 
.s 
are two sources of distortion, one from the production side with the presence of (| 
( 
monopolistic competition and the other from the consumption side with the CIA 丨 
distortion. However, when we introduce domestic taxation and the import tariff into 
‘'i 
ff--
the model for the correction of the distortion caused by the production side, the CIA 
distortion is taken into consideration at the same time. Shall we separate these two 
sources of distortions and deal with them with different policy instruments. Since the 
CIA constraint is a distortion from the consumption side, it can be dealt with 
consumption tax.^ ^ It is suggested that using policy instrument addressed directly to 
offset the source of the distortion is the optimal policy intervention. Finding the 
conditions for this is worthwhile. The CIA distortion can be corrected by consumption 
tax. Meanwhile, domestic production taxation and import tariff are used to deal with 
10 Palivos and Yip suggested that the first-best policy in the presence of a liquidity constraint is a 
consumption tax. See Palivos and Yip, 1996. 
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the distortion caused by monopolistic competition. The welfare improvement with 
trade of this arrangement will be compared with the previous one to see whether we 
should incorporate the use of consumption tax into the model in addition to domestic 
production taxation and import tariff which have been put into the model already. 
6.1 Closed Economy 
� 
Consider consumption tax levied on the monopolistic commodities. When ！ 
consumption tax is introduced, consumers face the following price of a differentiated ! 
product: 
1 
Pi^T,——\Pi (5¾ , 
( l -^c) ‘ 
\ 1 
i. 
where Zc is the consumption tax rate as a proportion of the after-taxed price. \ 
b 
Consider the closed economy first. The budget constraint for the closed 
1 
economy becomes 丨 
p^x^ +np'x. + M = p^Z + T+M. (54) 
The transfer income enter the budget constraint is defined as 
r = = X ( ^ + n , + r , x , A O (55) 
/=1 
• '• 
where r^x^p- is the revenue from the consumption tax. The CIA constraint in (6) 
becomes 
• \ P Q 、 + ^ 2 " P i ^ i = M . (56) 
The individualistic utility function is the same as (3). 
Utility maximization gives price (see Appendix) 
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巧 = 柳 ) 抖 （57) 
(1+,) 
{l-r ) 
If we have \ ^ = 1，the price becomes 
(i+r) 
i ^ = W ' ( x , ) . (58) 
That is, if we set Zc = -y, the CIA distortion will be corrected and only the distortion 
caused by monopolistic competition remains. : 
\ 
Firms in the homogeneous good industry are still facing the same profit 
functions in (8)，and profit conditions in (9) and (10), as before. At the same time, 
r 
1 
firms in the monopolistic industry face the profit function in (11) and profit conditions 
in (13) and (14) which are the same as in the previous case. The three assumptions for 
firms in the monopolistic industry, symmetry, large group case and strictly concave i 
, 
profit functions, are still held. Next, we will derive the social optimal for the closed .� 
economy. 
！ ‘^  
The social welfare function is the same as (26) and the budget constraint 
becomes 
p^Z-n{c,{x,) + F^)+np'x, +M = p^Z + T+M (59) 
The CIA constraint is 
^ ( A Z — "(c,.(x,) + i^�+^zJ2"A'A = M . (60) 
Differentiating the Lagrangian function with respect to x, and n gives 
<V(i / ) = # / O O A ) (61) 
gv,.(x,) = - ( c , . ( x , . ) + F , ) (62) 
Po 
54 
(61) gives the social optimal quantity produced for each commodity with CIA 
distortion corrected, while (62) gives the optimal number of commodities produced. 
These two equations are compared with the firm's optimal quantity produced for each 
commodity in (13) and the zero profit condition in (14). Domestic production tax is 
used to optimize the number of firms given x,_ as in the previous sections. (62) together 
with (58) and (14) give the optimal domestic taxation: , 
I 
.i 
, , : : l _ J i ^ f ^ i 
v,'(x,)x. 丨 
which is the same as Venables's result without the CIA constraint. ‘ 
6.2 Open Economy : 
} 
Consider the case with trade. The assumptions for both of the domestic firms \ 
and foreign firms in the monopolistic industry are still held in the case with trade. .丨 
'I 
Again, the market price of imports, pj, may be different from the resource cost, Cj, to 
the economy since tariff may be employed: 
pM-tj)=^j-
The prices faced by consumers are: 
A � ^ A 糊 
巧 、 办 ) （64) 
The individualistic social welfare function is the same as (16). The budget constraint 
and the CIA constraint for the open economy are as follows: 
/ ? � j c � + np-x. + mp^jXj +M = p^Z + T+M (65) 
55 
¢^ 1/^ 0^ 0 +<PiWi^i + ¢ 2 ^ ] ^ } : M (66) 
The transfer income, T, is defined as 
T = nT] +wII. +nr^x^p- +mz^XjP^j 
Utility maximization gives prices 
。 池 ) | ^ (67) , 
I 
一 ‘ ， ⑷ 絲 卿 丨 
Again, if we set Tc 二 -y, we have ‘ 
Pi-qv;{x,) (69) , 
Pj=qy/iXj) (70) , 
1 
with the CIA distortion corrected. The market equilibrium of that monetary economy , 
in the presence of the consumption tax is identical to the equilibrium without the CIA 
:'. � 
constraint. When the CIA distortion is corrected, the imperfection remained in the "" 
model is entirely caused by the monopolistically competitive commodities. The 
problem is then reduced to Venables's one. The only difference is that money, but not 
good 0，is the numeraire of the model. In Venable's model, good 0 is a single 
commodity which is the aggregation of the rest of the economy. Domestic production 
tax and import tariff are employed to optimize the numbers of domestically produced 
commodities and the imported ones. 
6.3 Welfare Effects ofTrade under Different Policies 
Again, we use the A operator as previous to examine the welfare effect on trade. (34) 
to (41) are still valid for this case with the CIA distortion corrected. Recall (41): 
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" , A ) t o + 5 ) . r = 4 1 + 5 ^ ) 
v, (x,) j � [ g \ a ) V,.(x,.) j 
Making use ofthe (14)，（69) and (70), (41) becomes 
— _ ( l — , , ) - ^ ^ “ ) H ^ + ^ 7 1 ) 
which is derived through the same process as the derivation of (42). The terms entered ^ 
1 
'1 4 
these two equations are the same except that we have (1 + f) in (42) but not in (71) 
since the CIA distortion is corrected for the latter. | 
i 
To find the optimal tarifF for this case, we go through (46) to (49) again. Recall 
we have (49): 
S ( l + ") = ^ ) + f . G i " 他 ） ] ； 
v/Os.) Vi(x.) L ^;V/(x.) j ' 
In this case, the import demand equation becomes 
。二#/(\)/^。(1 — ~) (72) 
which is derived from (17) and (70). 
On the other hand, substituting the price function for domestic products in (69) 
into the zero profit condition in (14), we have 
c,(x,) + 7^.=/7o^, '(x,)(l-/,)x,. (73) 
Substituting (72) and (73) into (49) we obtain the same first-order condition for the 
optimal tariff as (52): 
( 1 _ ” 鋼 ^ ^ [ 1 + 7 _ ^ ] . 
^ � � ( 1 + " ) v,(x,) L ' v / (x^ .>J 
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If 7/ = 0, and setting t 二广=1-~咖）， t j* in (52) becomes zero. If 77 > 0, and 
v,(x,.)x,_ 
ti = t; = 1 - ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , (52) becomes 
v / 缺 
1 f v . ( x . ) ) 
t*=\-~— 1 + 7/ 广广 <0 
1+^V ^/(^j)^jJ 
In this case, we have the same results as Venables's model since the CIA distortion is � 
corrected. 
_ I 
We have derived the optimal taxation and optimal tarifF in the case with CIA I 
distortion corrected by consumption tax. The following proposition gives the welfare •； 
i 





If the sub-utility functions are iso-elastic so 
v . ( jc j = jc/' where 6>, e (o,l) 
V) (jc.) = x f j where Oj G (0,1)， 
for (jyi < ¢1, the welfare improvement of trade will be larger if optimal taxation and 
optimal tariff are used without consumption tax compared with the case with 
consumption tax, Tc = -y, used also. For ¢2 > ^i, the welfare improvement of trade will 
be larger if all these instruments are used such that h = /,*，tj = ^* and [ = -y 
compared with the case without consumption tax. 
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Proof 
For the case with the CIA distortion corrected in the first place, rearranging terms in 
V (x ^ 1 ( v . ( x . ) � 
(71)’ and setting , ='; = 1 — 赫 ^ =G* = l - I ^ l + " ^ J , - 亡 卜 -
A^ : - 1 , � . ^ q ^ j { ^ M X 
Po I c,fe)+5 . 
U ^ M i^) J ! 
/ \ ;| 
1 f v,(x,) ^ 
1 V ^ l + " " # ^ � 0 . (74) 
( l i ^ ) 伙 ） 1 V ( A . J 
1 v ( “ J \ 
AV\ is the change in welfare for the economy when it is open to trade, with domestic 
taxation and tariff used optimally. The value of AVi is positive since both of the first 
1 
and the second terms on the right-hand side are positive. 
For the previous case with the CIA distortion present, (42), together with 
I 
(�l+T^(A-« 
,广 , :二 1 -咖）， 1 +於——, 
‘ v.'(x,)x, A , . . . ] 
1+77凡(於2_我） 
V ^1 y 
1 + 1^^(么-於）1 f v . ( x . ) ) 
and t. = t. * = 1 T ^ 1 + 7； ~~-~~-~~ , can be written as 
1 +杀尸。(於2-么)1+"^ "(〜)〜」 
U\ 
^ 2 二7 1 / � ^ \ ^ ^ M M X ~ ~ T ^ X 
f l + 魄 叫 l + ^ A f e - ^ o 
U(«) v,.(x,.) j U, 
f \ 
1 { V . ( x . ) ) 
1 y ~ ^ 1+" >0 (75) 
( 1 + " )快） 1 " ( a J 
1 v / ( l j ) l j J 
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Note that since we have set tj = •*, change in welfare for the economy will 
never be negative. It is what stated by Proposition 3. If optimal tariff is used, the 
equilibrium with trade has a higher level of social welfare than the equilibrium without 
trade, regardless of the value of U In (75), the first term and the third term on the 
right-hand side are positive. If ^ > ¢1, the second term is also positive and AV2 is 
positive. Even if ^ < ¢1, the second term should be positive since AV2 is ensured to be 
positive by Proposition 3. In addition, increase in welfare will be larger for ¢2 < ¢1 than 
for (jyi > ¢1. 
From (74) and (75), we find that in both cases, we have the welfare for the 
economy improved. However, the magnitude of the welfare improvements will be 
different for these two cases. Besides, the superior of one method over the other 
depends on the values of ¢2 and ¢1. 
If the sub-utility functions are iso-elastic stated above, it can be shown that (see 
Appendix) 
Z ^ ^ = A = 1 - 1 
^i(^i) ‘ A 
Y j : ^ = o 二1-丄 
v , W j ^j 
V ‘ (X )X V ‘(x )x 
where Oi and ^ are constant. That is, we have ‘ � ' ‘ and�——-~- constant. 
v,_(x,) v ^ ) 
Thus, the only difference between (74) and (75) is the term 
. I f (j>2 < ¢1, we have ^V^ > AFj, since ->1 . 
义 义 
Y+sPMi-¢1) 1+77P0(^2-¢1) 
V ^1 y V u^ y 
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This means, the use of optimal production taxation and optimal tariff yields a higher 
improvement in welfare compared with the case with consumption tax used also. 
On the other hand, if (jh > ¢1, we have AF2 <AFj, since 
- < 1 . In this case, the use of consumption tax Zc = -y, optimal 
X \ 
: + J ^ P o i ^ 2 - ^ l ) ) 
production taxation and optimal tariff altogether yields a higher improvement in 
welfare compared with the case without consumption tax. Q.E.D, 
If (jyi = ¢1, consumption tax will not be used as there is no CIA distortion. 
Therefore, when there is CIA distortion in the economy, to have a larger 
welfare improvement of trade, one should choose to use the optimal production 
taxation and optimal tariff without consumption tax if ¢2 < ¢1. On the other hand, if 
么 > ^i, consumption tax with Tc set equal to -y is used together with optimal 
production taxation and optimal tariff. 
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Chapter 7. Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, a model with a small monetary economy consisting ofan industry 
producing a homogeneous product and another engaging in the production of 
differentiated products under monopolistic competition is presented. Money is 
introduced into the model via the cash-in-advance constraint. The value of cash 
balances required by different sectors are thus important in determining the gains from 
trade, the optimal taxation, the optimal tariff and whether to use consumption tax in 
addition. 
We find that trade improves welfare only under certain conditions. If the cash 
balance for the importable is smaller than that of the exportable, the optimal domestic 
production taxation is found to be negative. Free trade will then increase social welfare 
with taxation used optimally. If tariff is used together with the optimal production 
taxation, the optimal tariff is negative, no matter the number of imported differentiated 
products can be affected by the domestic economy or not. On the other hand, if the 
cash balance for the importable is greater than that of the exportable, the optimal 
production taxation is negative only under certain conditions, and it is possible to have 
it zero. With domestic taxation used optimally, free trade increases social welfare only 
under certain conditions. If the number of imported differentiated products cannot be 
affected by the domestic economy, the optimal tariff is positive with production 
taxation policy used optimally. If the number can be altered by the domestic economy, 
the optimal tariff can be positive or negative, depending on certain conditions. 
Moreover, with iso-elastic sub-utility functions, if the cash balance for the importable is 
greater than that of the exportable, the welfare improvement of trade will be greater 
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with the optimal production taxation and the optimal tariff used only compared with 
the consumption tax used in addition, and vice versa. Besides, in the case with tariff as 
the only policy instrument, the optimal tariff is positive, regardless of the value of the 
cash balances. 
Some literature suggests that for a small economy, free trade is the optimal 
trade policy. In practice, free trade is called for to improve countries' own welfare. For 
their own sake, countries should not use trade barriers such as tariff This is a part of 
what the GATT or the nowadays WTO promoted." However, most of the results 
obtained in the thesis suggest that, the optimal tariff is non-zero for a small monetary 
' > 
economy with a monopolistically competitive industry. The case of having free trade 
the optimal policy is possible, but rare. What important is that, when conducting trade 
policy, we should base on models which can capture more realistic features. Today, 
industries involving monopolistic competition are quite common, and it is justifiable 
that different sectors require different cash balances, it thus becomes a question 
whether free trade continues to be optimal for a small economy. 
As suggested by Either (1979, 1982), product differentiation may be more 
prevalent in the production of intermediate goods rather than fmal goods. Less 
developed countries are likely to import intermediate goods and export final products. 
At the same time, final products usually subject to a larger cash balance compared to 
intermediate goods. It is the case for ^ < 办，and it is suggested by the thesis that the 
optimal tariff should be negative rather than zero, that is, a subsidy should be granted 
to those imports. 
11 Of course, they also concem the weLfare in the viewpoint of the world instead of home country's 
welfare only. 
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On the other hand, we can also consider the durability of goods. Less 
developed countries usually import durable goods and export non-durable ones. Since 
non-durable goods require a larger cash balance than durable goods, we have 么 < ^i 
again. If the imported durable goods are produced under monopolistic competition, the 
optimal tariff should be negative as in the previous case. 
Thus, for less developed countries importing these types of goods, imported 
subsidies, instead of free trade, may be desirable. Planners should not stick on the 
belief of free trade without considering the features of the real world such as the 
characteristic of products traded and the role of money. Therefore, empirical works 
relating to these features should be studied more extensively for reference when 
conducting trade policies. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are some limitations for the thesis. 
We only consider the welfare effects on the domestic economy, leaving the world 
welfare not considered. Since the welfare of the foreign country is not taken into 
consideration, it remains a question whether the optimal tariff is globally welfare-
improving or not. However, within the present setting of the model, it is not possible 
for us to have it studied. There is space for more examination on this aspect. 
In addition, the use of domestic production taxation and import tariff is 
addressed when considering policy interventions. It is believed that for a small 
monetary economy with monopolistic competition, welfare effects of other prevalent 
trade policies such as quotas, voluntary export restraints, and export subsidies, will be 
different from those under the traditional barter economy with perfect competitive 
markets. The thesis may be extended to examine the effects of these trade policies. 
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Appendix 
For the close economy, the maximization problem should be 
MaxL^ = f/(xo,F(X1,jC2,...,x,...)) 
n 
s.t. Po^o + EPi^i + M = p^Z + T + M 
i=l 
n 
and ¢ ^ 0 + ^ ^ i Z ^ ^ / = M ， 
j=i • 
The Lagrangian function is 
( — n n A 
L = U{x^,V(x,,X2,...,x”..)) +1 p,Z + r + M- p,x, - Y,p,x, - (j>,p^x^ -伞工卩^义、 
V i=\ i=\ 乂 
First order differentiation with respect to xo and x, yields 
4^二巧-尔。-却。^^1=0 
办0 
4 ^ 二 ^ 2 ^ • (^,)—M - ^ i P i = 0 ’ ox. 
Dividing the second equation by the first one gives 
^ V ( x . ) = ^ ^ 
U, ‘ “ (1 + ^ )^/^。 
or ^ , ' ( x , ) = (l + r ) ^ 
where q = � , (l + r ) = # a n d 7 ^ = l 
U, \^¢, Po 
For the open economy, given the social welfare function in (16)，the budget constraint 
in (18)，and the CIA constraint in (20)，we have the following constraint maximization 
problem: 
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max U = f/(Xo, nv. {x.) + mv. (Xj)) 
s.t. Po^o + ^ Pi^i + Wj^j + M = p^Z + M + T 
and j^)QXQ +^^np^x. +4>2^PjXj - M 
The Lagrangian function is 
L = U[x^ ,nv. (x.) + mv. (x.)) 
+ x(^^Z^M^T-p^x, -npiXi -mp.x. -^,p^x^ -^2np.x. -^^mpjX^) 
Differentiating the Lagrangian function with respect to Xo, x, and Xj gives 
^^U,-Xp,-X^,p^ = 0 
办0 
^J^ 
—=U^nv. ‘(x.) - Xnp, — Xn^^p, 二 0 
d\ 
^ j^ 
—=U^mv. • {x.) - Mp. - - ^ j ) j = 0 
<i 
Thus, we have 
^ , . ( , . ) . O i M A 
U, ‘ ” (1 + ^ 0 
or qv.'(x,) = (l + r)Pi i = l,...,n 
and ^ v / ( . , ) = f t M Z . 
U, J “ (1 + 於1)凡 
or ^ / ( ^ ; ) - 0 + r )^ ; j = s , . " , s w 
w h e r e p ^ , ( l + , ) = # / ^ . = l a n d P , & 
"1 W i A) Po 
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To derive (29)，the Lagrangian function is 
f 1 ^ 
L - U — {p^Z - n(Ci (x,) + Fi)),«v. (x,) 
\Po 乂 
+ x[p,Z + T + M — p,Z + n{c, (x,) + F,) - np,x, - ¢, [p,Z - n{c, (x,) + F,)) - 4>^np,x,) 
The first order condition with respect to jc, is 
^ Y^  1 
—=—"1 ——nc,. ‘ (A) + U2nv. ‘ (x,.) + Anc, ’ (x,.) 
办, Po 
-Anp^ + A ^ « c , I {x^) - A42^Pi - 0 
Manipulation yields 
^ - c / ( x , . ) 
1 + / 
_ L _ A _ A ^ 
. "2 V o ~ ^ ~ ^ ^ where^ = — , a = j j 
1 ^ + r-jrP0-yrPJ2 
^1 ^1 • 
The first order condition with respect to n is 
^J^ 1 
—=~^i ——(c, (x,) + F. )+U^v. (x.) + A(c. (x.) + F. )-^p,x. 
dn Po 
+A¢,{cXx,)^F.)-A¢^p.x. - 0 
Manipulation gives 
q^i (Xr) = — + ^ {¢2 - ¢1) (C/ (^ / ) + Fi) 
� A ) "1 
To derive the optimal taxation in (31), substituting (14) into (30), given prices defined 
as (7), yields 
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i W / ' 0 0 ( i - , , K 二 們 0 0 
( l + r ) “ 1 丄 >^  . . . � 
^ “ —— + 7 r ( ^ 2 — ^ ^ ) 
Po "1 
Thus, w e have 
(1 + ,)丄 
(1广）—兄⑷ Po — 咖 ) (1 + 力 
‘ v , ' ( ^ , K r 1 ^ 义 . . , 0 ^, (x' )x' . f i + 义 n U 6 ^ 
一 + 7 T ( ^ - ^ i ) l + 7 T ^ ( 0 2 - ^ i ) 
\Po "1 ) V U, J 
or . , * . 1 - - ^ , ^ ( 1 + 厂 ） , 
作 ' ) 乂 + 知 ( “ ) 
V ^1 J 
a L 
To derive (32)，note that if ——> 0，(29) becomes 
dx^ 
± _ A _ A ^ j , 
i ^ > ^ 5 ^ ' c/(x) 
1+厂 i + r - ^ A - ^ A ^ . 
Manipulation yields 
A 1 
产 ^ ^ . 
To derive (34)，recall (2) and (15), which can be rewritten as 
i o = l ( p � z - + / 0 0 + ^ ) ) 
Po 




A ^ o = - k ' - ^ o ) 
Po . � 
二 丄(—{<^ t <X ) + Fi )^ -脈,】) 
Po 
where An = n ’ - n. 
To derive (35), consider (4): 
l ^ - S v , ( x , ) 
iG_S 
'i 
and from (16)，we have 
'•> 
F' = fi, Vj- (Xj-) + mvj (xj). 
Hence, 
Av=r-v 
=V. (x )An+mv. (x.) 
To derive (42), we substitute (7), (14), (17), (21) and (22) into (41). 
Recall (41)， 
^ 4 , f e ) + i ^ ) = 4 1 + ^ ^ ) . 
vM) ‘‘ 、 州 v,(x,) J 
Substituting those equations into (41), the LHS ofit becomes 
Vj(Xj)pX^-t,)x, / N 
m ( � mp \;^-t )x 
v,.00 
v / i ) ) ^ , ( i , > o ( l - ( k , , � L , \ 1 
= " - " " ^ ^ 7 ^ - ” ( * “ K w 
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Thus, 
rrtqVj(Xj)Po f v/(x,)x, . . ^ ' ( ^ ; ) ^ ; A ^ ^ = A [ , f 户。|〔'_(义）+ 巧、 
(l + r) 1 v , ( x , ) ^ i) Vj(Xj) V "J 1 彻 v , 0 0 J 
To derive (46)，we totally differentiate (15). Thus, we have 
办0 1 f a " / ( � z7� aXj dmdyi� ~~- = c, (x,) + F. -mc, — c.x. —~"^-~~ 
dp, pX 办 / ' ‘ “ ^Pj ] ] ‘ ^ ； ^Pj) 
Substituting rj = ^ ^ into the equation gives 
dXj m 
会 :丄 [ -力咖 +分 - ,参 ( 1 + ")] 
dPj Po\ ^Pj ^Pj 
To derive (48), (45) is totally differentiated: 
dn‘ ,、、 dmdx ^^v (^: ) A ， 
(v,(x,))+ - y i x , ) + m ~ ~ — — 
外 产 八 � � d x . dp^ 广 “ ^x, d p j 
� 1 f dn , ( � � � d m x^ dx\ 二乂— X (c, (x,) + K) c,x, — mc, 
^Po [ ^Pj ' “ 办 ） 尔 . � ] ‘ ^ P j J 
, . . dm ^j • , . . 
Substituting T] = -mto the equation gives 
dXj m 
Sn ( / \ 1) A , . f 1 , � v, .00") 
- ^ v,(x,)+ c,.(x,) + i ^ ^ - =mf ^ - c , l + 77 +^/(^y) + ^ ^ . 
^PjK Po) ^Pj\ Po ^j 
10 
To derive (49)，note that from (45), we have 
dn — dx^ ( l + y/) 
_ ¥ = � p , . ( c , ( x , ) + i ^ ) . 
dn 




^Pj (c,(x,) + i^)V PJ 
d x , ( 1 v , 0 O " ) 
- m ^ g , l c y ( l + ") + v / ( x ) ) + ^ ^ . 
^P\ A) Xj. J 
Manipulating the above gives the result � 
Cy(l + ") = c,(i,) + ^ G i ^ 咖)� 
y/(Xj) v , ( x , ) 1^  v/(Xj)xJ' 
For (52), substituting (50) and (51) into (49) gives 
� l — ,y)AV/(X�（1 + ") = � 1 - Q ^ V V O O � 1 I ^ ^ j ( ^ j ) � 
( i+r) v / ( x . ) " v,(x,)(i+r) 1 ^/(^j)^jJ' 
Manipulation yields the result 
( H * ) 4 4 ^ i m f i + " _ z ^ . 
^ “ � ( 1 + ") v ^ 1 v/(x.)x, j 
For proposition 3, consider the cases with 77 = 0 and rj > 0. 
If rj = 0，(52) becomes 
t 
71 
I , . * ) = { l - t f - ^ 
^ j ‘ ^ 丨,v,.(x,.) 
( H ^ V ^ . ( i _ , ) V ( ^ ) - ^ 、 吵 �< ( l - 0 ^ ^ . 
^ ^ > v A ) ^ ' , v , 0 0 v / x � ^ ” ” � 
• 
I f 7 7 > 0 , 
f H * � V O S > y = M h , ( x , K f i | " 他 ） ) 讽 ) 〜 
� � ‘ v . ( x . ) (1 + ") v , (x , ) L v/ix.)x.J 哄 ） 
= i L f ^ 2 ^ f ! ^ + " ] 4 ^ ] i ^ ( i + " ) : ( H , ) z ^ 
(1 + 77) V,.(x,.) t yj(Xj) J (1 + ") v,(x,.) \ ) v , ( x J 
Thus, we have 
( 1 — , . * ) 、 軌 < ( 1 - 0 ^ ^ ^ 
^ � ) v . { x ^ ) ^ 1) V,(X,) 
for both of the cases with r\ = 0 and v{ > 0. 
Proposition 5 states that in the rare case if 
l + ^ 2 - - i ) 1 f v . ( x , ) ) 
1 二 1 + 7 ； ~ ~ - " " - ~ ~ 
1 + 厂 1+7/1 y/(Xj)xJ 
with (jh > ¢1, the optimal tariff would be zero. If it is the case, proposition 2 is also 
satisfied that free trade improves social welfare. To show that, recall proposition 2 
which states that for ^ > 办，free trade increases social welfare if and only if 
1 + r . ^;(^. K 
1 + ^ 凡 (么 - « ")(〜）. 
义 
1 + 77^(^^2-^0 1 f ” “ � � � k • 1 •江• 
If Uj = 丄 1 I ^ ^jy^j) , and thus optimal tariff is zero, 
r ” _ i + " L ¥ / ( 认 
proposition 2 is also satisfied. To prove, note that we have 
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1 〔 1 , , , 制 ） 1 + 和 ( 式 - 於 ） 
l + "l^ j c , / O s ) J 1 + 7 
Since 
1 VjOCj.) / 1 � 他 ） 明 》 丄 ^ 0 0 . ) 
1 + rj^-~~-~" < (1 + 77)^^-~"-"~ 二 ^ -~~^ + rj~~ .；、, 〒/(〜） � / O o ) 〒 / ( 太 》 ¥ / ( x ) ) 
we have 
1 � 1 v ( x ) ) Vj{Xj) 
1 + 7 / ^ - ~ " - ^ < ^ - ~ ~ - ~ ~ 
l + ^v ^ j ^ / ( ^ j V ~^'Oo) 
1+,|凡(武-^0 .^. 
and ^1 ^ _ W L . 
i + r ^ , v / ( x . ) 
^ 
1 f “ Y � � 1 + 7 7厂。 (么一於） 
Thus, if i 1 + jj 側 " = ^1 ，we will also have 
l + " l ^ y ^ / ^ ) J 1 + / 
1+7 〉伪)义" 
l + � j - A ( ^ - « v ) ( i � 
To derive (57), consider the following Lagrangian function: 
L = U{x^, nv. {x.)) + x(^p^Z + T + M - p^x^ - np'x. —^z^i^Xo —^MA'A) 
( 、r 一 (l + ^ J ) 
二 【 / ( X o ， " v , - ( I , ) ) + 义 i?oZ + T + M — Po^o - <t>vPPo — " A J . \Pi 
\ v ~ ^ c ) y 
First order differentiation gives 
^ ^ U , - X p ^ - A p J , = 0 
办0 
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dL (l + cJ,) 
^ = f / , v , ' ( x , . ) - A ) ^ p , . = 0 办丨 （l-rJ 
Thus, 
q , v , ' ( x ) ^ A ( l + ^ J 1 A 
U\ _义(1+(0(1—、）凡 
qv;{x^ = ^ ^ . p . 
( l - ^ c ) 
If i l M . l 
( l - o , 
we have (1 + y) = (1 - r J and Tc = -y. 
There is no CIA distortion remained. 
To derive (61) and (62), we have the following Lagrangian fiinction: 
( 1 ^ 
L = U Z-n——(c,.(x,) + i^),wv.(x,) 
V Po ) 
+ A ( A ) Z + T + M 一 p,Z + ^ c . ( x , ) + Fi) 一 np^x, — ¢, [p,Z - n{c, (x,) + F,)) 一 小押‘^乂*) 
The first order condition with respect to x, is given by 
# = — R j _ " c , ’ ( � ) + ^ < ( x , _ ) + h c / ( x , ) + ^ i " < ( x , ) - A | ^ p , = 0. 
dx.� Po ( l -U 
Manipulation yields 
c;{x)=qv;{x;)p,. 
On the other hand, 
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^ =--",丄(c,(\) + Fj+[J2V,(X,) + A(C' (x^) + h\) 
如 Po 
+ A^(c^,(x,) + / < 0 - A x , | ^ ) A = 0 . 
V-^c) 
Manipulation gives 
^v(^/) = - k ( ^ . ) + ^ > 
Po 
To derive the optimal taxation in the case with consumption tax used, substitute (14) 
and (58) into (62): 
A ( i - , , k = A ^ O O 
^ V > 0 ( l - O " ^ , = A ^ C O 
v / ( x , ) ( l - ^ K = v . ( x ) 
( l - 0 = ^ ^ 
‘ ^ / ( ^ , K 
� i — 咖 ） < 0 
‘ ^/(^,K 
To derive (68), we have the Lagrangian function: 
L = f/(xo,wv.(x.) + mv.(x.}) 
+A(^�Z+M + r — ^ x�-np'x. -mp]x.-仏乂。-¢2^-^^ -伞：—〜乂〉 
= f/(Xo,"v,.(x,) + —x》） 
+ / p o Z + M + r-poXo —^ 1^尸0% - ^ , 7 T ^ A -^^jTT^Pj 
1 (l-^J (l-^J J 
The first order conditions are: 
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^ = U,-Xp^-^,p^ = 0 
办0 
--U,nv;{x,)-An^^^p,^0 
办 , 2 '、 " （1 —、广 
f / . v , ' ( x , ) - 2 | i ^ A - 0 
( i - 0 
丛 = " 2廣广 ( 1 / ) —加 ^ ^ / ^二 0 办, ， " ( l - ^ J ' 
^ v / ( x , ) - A " | ^ A . = 0 
Thus, we have 
^ ^ ^ 2 i ^ = A ^ ] ^ l _ _ ^ 
U,—义（1 + ^0^)(1-。） 
or qv;{x,) = ^ ^ . P ^ 
( l - ^ c ) 
and 
" 2 V O S ) 二 A(1 + ^ ) / ^ 1 
—U\ " ^ ( l + ^ ^ J / 7 , ( l - r J : 
or � V O O ) = " ^ ^ 
(l + v) 
If^——H"=1, i.e., T^c = -y, the CIA distortion is corrected. 
V-^c) 
To derive (74) from (71), consider we have: 
� ( x . / ^ i ^ ( l - 0 - ^ ^ ^ ^ ( W , ) W i + ^ ^ M ± 4 
WA " L v , . ( x , ) �丨 , v / x � � 乂 。 U ' ( a ) v^.(x,) J 
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叫-—7~"VT^-妙。xfe^M)-^^(i-�)� 
Po |C,.(x,.) + 7^ 1 v.{x.) v.{x.) ) 
U*(“） v . (x,) J 
1 , � (, v / ( x ^ ) x . 1 � Vj(Xj) Y| 
= - rmqvXx,)p. X 1-~-~~^^7——r l + 7] . , � 
f ^ + M ^ | 1 �(x�（ i+")k Vv(5)JJ 
U*(“） v.(x.) J 
/ \ 
1 1 f yj(^j)) 
:二7 ^ ^ M i ) P o X 1 T ~ ^ 1 + " r T ^ 
( P o 丨 咖 + ” A 】肌 I v,-(x,) L x^.v/(x^.)j 
1^(^) v,(x,) j 1 V/(X,.)X,. J 
'\ 
To derive (75), consider we have (41): 
- , . O g f v / O Q x , ] i . v , ,ogx , . ( i ^ _ f i + g ^ ^ j ^ ^ ) 
(l + r ) 1 v , ( x , ) � ” v , ( x , ) � " J lg,(a) v , ( x , ) ) 
AK = ^ J ? ( ? � x f ^ ^ ( 1 — 0 - ^ ^ ^ ( 1 - , , ) ] 
U + f i M l 5 _ l (1+,) 1 吵 》 御 " J 
� g V ) V.(x.)， 
1 + — ( “ ) v / ( x > 7 . 
1+丄凡(么—於1) v,Os) 
1 m ^ M j ) P o "1 
7 _ Z ^ ^ ^ ( ^ 1 (i+r) X i i ( ^ ^ _ ^ j 
U ( a ) v , o o J , ( 1 + ^ 奶 _ i _ L ^ � ( ' � ] 
1+4凡(么-於）(1+"凡'广7.('》」 
V Ui J 
、 + — ( “ � ) 1 + : ( 1 ^ ^ — - 於 ) 、 
A 义 
1 mqVj(Xj)Po l + y / ^ o f e - ^ 0 l + ^ A ) f e — i ) 
� P o , cXx^)+F7\ (l+r) X 1 1 . v '(x ) ) 
L _ 咖 ) J x ^ ^ ; p ; ^ h " ^ j 
� V ( A J 
77 
•••么厂2 二 7 \�「、零/ (^； )Po X "^“0"“^^ X 
( A + M f ^ l U^pX<k-<h) 
U'(^) v,w j "1 
f \ 
1 1 「1 (^^ ；) 1 1 ^ ^ ~ 1 + 7/~"-~~-~~ . 
(1 , "、咖） 1 V/OS.)J 
1 � V / ( ^ . ) J 
V I (X )JC V - ’ (x • )jC • 
To derive that ‘ “ ‘ and ———-~~- are constant, consider the price of the /th 
咖 ） ^j{^j) 
product, (21). With the sub-utility function 
v,(x,) = x / ' where 6>,e(0，l), 
the demand function can be expressed as 
, r 1 p^ ( i ^ r ) F 
X. 一 • 
L",A q ) 
The price elasticity of demand is 
dx.p ( 1 \ x_L_/1 {l + r ) Y ' 
£ = — — ' - L = u^r ' --~~— 
‘ 如1 ^ , l<^,-lj ‘ V^, PS ) 
_ r 1 ) 1卜 1 ( 1 +叫 6 
� " , - 1知人凡《 q y 
1 
— . . • • • 
1-《 
Thus, we have 
代 = 7 ^ ， 1-。 
It follows that 
78 
^;'(^/K =" 1 
v,(x,.) ‘ 1 - ^ , “ 
We can derive the equation for the imported monopolistic goods with label j in the 
same way and thus 
V 0 ^ ) �二 0 : 丄 
Vj{x^) j 1-Sj 






\ Engel Curve 
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V=n %+mXj \ \ \ y / . 
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V=nXi - ^^^^^quilibriuib withoal t rade^-^— 
^ \ 
Xo Xo' 0^ 
Figure 1: The Engel Curve 
The marginal rate of substitution between xo and V, denote by q, are the same 
in each equilibrium. Thus, we come to the conclusion that both of the 
equilibria with and without trade lie on the same Engel Curve of U which 
may be written as F=g(ro). Note that this is the case for welfare improved 
with optimal production taxation and optimal tariff used. 
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^ ^ , good i 令 \ 丨 1 + y Pi 
K Y — • 
good 0 
Figure 2: The welfare effect of trade with CIA distortion: the case for ¢1 < ¢1 
To illustrate the welfare effect of the CIA distortion, for simplicity, we 
consider this distortion without the presence of the production distortion. 
Notes: 
a: production under free trade in both monetary and barter economies 
b: consumption under free trade in a barter economy 
c: consumption under free trade in a monetary economy with ¢1 < ¢1 
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good i 
" ^ ^ ^ ) 
:^^^  1 + ”丨 
Y 
— — • 
good 0 
Figure 3: The welfare effect of trade with CIA distortion: the case for ¢2> <h 
Again, for simplicity, we consider the CIA distortion without the presence of 
the production distortion. 
Notes: 
a: production under free trade in both monetary and barter economies 
b: consumption under free trade in a barter economy 
c: consumption under free trade in a monetary economy with ¢1 > ¢1 
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